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This is a part of RBC Thought Leadership and Eurasia Group’s joint report

A shift in global oil and gas prospects, from Venezuela to Qatar, changes the investment outlook for Albertan exports—and the big infrastructure projects designed to get them to overseas markets.

Canada’s ambitions to be an energy superpower—including oil and gas—is being tested after the U.S. intervention in Venezuela. But the challenges lie well beyond Canada’s immediate neighbourhood. Long-term demand for oil and gas remains an open question, especially as Asia continues to turn to electrons to power growth. A global surplus of supply, including American LNG, clouds the picture further. And then there’s the question of global growth. No growth, no need for more energy, from Canada or anywhere else.

In one strategic swoop in Caracas, U.S. President Donald Trump has attempted to ringfence the Americas with Washington as its most consequential capital. In that respect, Trump may have weakened Canada’s most valuable negotiating card—energy exports. A resurgent Venezuela crude production could displace Canadian oil in the U.S. and leave it scrambling for market share with Saudis and others elsewhere. It’s a potential competitive shock. Over the past 25 years, Canada had solidified its position as the foremost supplier of oil and gas to the world’s biggest oil market, accounting for nearly three out of every five imported barrels entering the U.S. An industry built to serve America now pumps out a record five million barrels per day, compared to just over two million bpd in 2000, with more than 90% of its exports ending up in refineries in the U.S. Midwest, West Coast and the Gulf Coast.

With the U.S. moving at lightning speed on securing its energy and resource needs, Canada needs to pivot quickly, not just to capture a portion of the investment dollars being spent in a hurry, but also to defend its turf and diversify its exports (hello, Xi)—everything all at once to match the American blitz.

Disruptions to the north-south energy flow could deal an economic and political blow to Canada. The industry generates close to $100 billion in annual revenues. A decline in energy exports could also test national unity. Failure to build out Alberta’s oilsands will be seen by the province as a national declaration of political war, at a time when the province’s independence movement is louder than it’s been in a generation. Land-locked Alberta is also at odds with neighbouring British Columbia, which is opposed to building an oil pipeline across its territory to tidewater.

Canada has a few strong cards to play. Venezuela may be home to the world’s largest proven crude oil reserves, but Canada boasts the world’s third largest, with the added advantages of a world-class infrastructure, ready expertise, technology and the capital to deliver on America’s oil needs. After decades of dithering, Ottawa, under Mark Carney, seems to have the will to follow through.

There’s a strong correlation between Canadian oil’s supremacy in the U.S. coinciding with Venezuelan crude’s steady decline (see chart). Both trade primarily in what’s known in the business as “heavy oil,” which has the consistency of peanut butter—it’s harder to extract from the ground, is energy and carbon-intensive to produce, and needs thinning diluents to push through pipelines, adding to shipping costs. Canadian oil’s viscous nature makes it ideal for making gasoline/diesel, jet fuel and plastics, compared to the light blend pumped out from American shale basins.

Canada's oilsands has displaced Mexican and Venezuelan heavy oil in the U.S.

As Canadian oilsands firms innovated over the past decade to overcome cost and emissions intensity, Venezuela’s state-owned Petróleos de Venezuela (PDVSA) fell into a state of neglect, mismanagement, and corruption. Another blow: in 2018, the company was looted by thieves, stripping the oil company of vital equipment, including copper wiring, and its skilled workers fleeing to neighbouring states. If U.S. firms return to Venezuela, they will have to start from scratch in many ways, with some suggesting it will cost upwards of US$100 billion over 10 years to get the Venezuelan oil sector up and running. In a best-case scenario, it would take at least a decade to displace some of Canada’s 4.5 million bpd of oil shipments to the U.S. from Venezuela, which currently produces around 750,000 bpd. That would give Canada a head start to adjust to the new energy paradigm.

Heavy oil is deeply integrated into U.S. refinery systems, which should give oil executives in Calgary some comfort. As early as the 1990s, U.S. refiners began investing billions in heavy-sour configurations to run Canadian and Latin American barrels, given the proximity of both energy sources. Total refining capacity in Gulf Coast refineries (known as PADD 3) rose 2.9 million barrels per day, while Midwest refineries (PADD 2) grew 700,000 bpd. Both regions boosted coker capacity of 1 million bpd during the period.

U.S.-Canadian joint ventures also started to spring up, such as Cenovus and ConocoPhillips collaborating on two refineries in the U.S. as cross-border upstream and downstream flows became entrenched. Meanwhile, Canadian pipeline operators Enbridge and South Bow (spun off from TC Energy) cast a wider system of pipeline spurs and added capacity to reach the Gulf Coast and the Midwest.

Canada’s heavy oil is prized in other markets. While much is made of China becoming an electro-state and other Asian markets switching to renewables, there are few viable substitutes for heavy oil as a critical ingredient for plastics. Rising income levels across Asia is set to fuel ever more demand for TVs, refrigerators, electronics, and Labubu dolls, even as population growth in many emerging markets tapers off. The federal government-owned TMX pipeline expansion has already demonstrated a market for Canadian oil outside the U.S. While overall more than 90% of Canadian oil exports are destined for the U.S., only a third of TMX’s shipmentsended up across the border with the rest shipped to refineries in China, Singapore, South Korea and India.

After all, Asia is where the growth’s at, especially with Europe set to see declining demand. The continent is forecast to account for 80% of total net oil demand growth until 2030, according to the IEA. Indian demand alone is expected to grow almost one million bd, with emerging Asia also in the market for more barrels.

There’s also the perennial question of the value of Canada spending billions on an industry presumed to be slowing down—in a crowded market. While the International Energy Agency recently retreated from its “peak oil” forecast, global demand is inching up only slowly while producers ramp up. New player Guyana, led by production from a three-way ExxonMobil-Chevron-CNOOC venture, has quickly boosted production to around 900,000 bpd in a short span of time. Several OPEC producers and independents such as Brazil, Mexico and Norway also have ambition to pump up oil volumes. While the Saudis, the most influential OPEC producer, have been quiet as U.S. moves threaten to drive down oil prices, Brent crude prices of around US$60 per barrel are nowhere near Saudi government’s fiscal breakeven prices of around US$90.

For Canadian oil firms, which spent roughly $25 billion in dividends and buybacks in 2025, the risk is to embark on a new capital-intensive project without a new pipeline proposal or much visibility when it comes to market direction. Another caveat: Ottawa would insist companies contribute to a much-anticipated and expensive carbon capture storage and utilization (CCUS) project to offset new emissions. Indeed, it’s in writing as part of the Ottawa-Alberta Memorandum of Understanding.

The MoU, which offers a path for the oil industry’s expansion and inject a new investment wave in the country, is an iconic symbol of what Canadian energy can achieve. If it succeeds, the MoU could serve as a model for how Canada can deliver its resources, assets and expertise to a customer base beyond the United States.

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An over-correction to the recent surge in irregular immigration is squeezing employers, hammering colleges and universities, and threatening to delay a new wave of resource projects and infrastructure builds—at the same time as Canada is nearing a demographic cliff.

Canadian public and political sentiment toward immigration is increasingly negative. But the sentiment is running contrary to the country’s needs: Canada’s aging population is facing declining fertility rates, leaving immigration central to the expansion of the skilled workforce. Cutting back on immigration drastically could lead to a rapid dip in population, hurting efforts to maintain living standards, drive economic and business activity and meet near-term economic ambitions.

The Mark Carney government’s plan to clamp down on immigration comes after years of expansionary policy. Temporary residents increased beyond capacity during Justin Trudeau’s decade-long tenure that began in 2015. Housing infrastructure and community services were overloaded, and productivity declined as temporary low-wage workers removed the incentive from some businesses to invest in technology, training or equipment. Targets for new temporary residents, including students, are down by over 550,000 in 2026 compared to 2024. And permanent resident targets are down by over 100,000 from 2024 admissions. Even with these reductions, Canadians feel immigration levels are too high.  

The government crackdown may face challenges advancing its broader agenda. The 2025 federal budget allocates billions for nation-building projects to jumpstart the economy and insulate Canada from geopolitical threats. It dedicates funding to scaling Canadian businesses, recognizing larger firms create more jobs and contribute disproportionately to economic growth and productivity.

Making good on these investments, and seizing opportunities before the country, will rely on a skilled workforce—without a smarter immigration strategy, Canada has little hope of attracting that skilled labour. Economic immigrants bring skills experience, innovation, and financial investments. They will be essential to addressing labour shortages in critical sectors like healthcare, technology, skilled trades, and agriculture, as they have done in the past. Global talent will also be key to scaling Canadian companies in key sectors and avoiding population declines in rural parts of the country.

Attracting the talent Canada needs will also be increasingly difficult given growing global competition for talent. By some estimates, the global population is set to peak by mid-2080 and is already shrinking in Europe and China. Other countries will be rolling out the red carpet to prospective citizens as their domestic populations shrink. Canada’s approach to immigration needs to be as much about recruiting as it is selecting.

Competing globally to recruit the best and brightest will require a strong international brand, which recent policy volatility is jeopardizing. Changes to Canada’s immigration point system in recent years have created back doors and side doors, making the system less predictable and transparent—deterring the people needed to build a strong economy from applying. The system has been described as a “lottery” depending less on merit and more on timing and has been criticized for long processing times—over two years for those entering through the entrepreneurial program.

Even if Canada addresses these recruitment challenges, there is little guarantee the newcomers will stay. New research shows one in five immigrants leave within 25 years of arriving in Canada, and the most highly skilled are the biggest flight risks.  Whether newcomer or Canadian-born, many of Canada’s graduates from degree programs in science, technology, engineering and math (STEM) disciplines, emigrate after graduation, primarily to the U.S. And Canada’s three largest startup cities—Toronto, Vancouver, Montreal—lag far behind global leaders, pulling in less than 5% of the venture capital investment that flows into places like San Francisco, New York and Boston.

Attracting and retaining the best and brightest will require more transparent, predictable pathways, faster processing times and investment in infrastructure and services—like housing and health care—to ensure a high standard of living. With a steady inflow of talent, Canada will be better placed to grow businesses and invest in the innovation needed to retain top talent.

In addition to attracting world-class talent, Canada can train for it. International students represent an important opportunity that Canada should be careful not to overlook. Foreign students who graduate from reputable programs in in-demand fields offer needed skills and recognized credentials, making them great candidates for permanent residency. They are also more likely to stay in the country and see higher earnings than immigrants who pursue permanent residency directly. That is, of course, if they come in the first place.

The latest federal budget cut international student numbers drastically for the next two years, by almost half of 2025’s target. Even at its new low, the target is unlikely to be met. International applications have declined significantly as frequent changes to post-graduate work permit eligibility have prospective students doubting whether their studies will provide a path to staying in Canada. The new system is also clunky and cumbersome for applicants. It features new hoops that students and institutions must jump through, namely Provincial Attestation Letters to enforce annual permit caps.

Canada can re-open student pathways and make them appealing again by rebuilding its brand as a country that welcomes foreign students and offers transparent immigration pathways after graduation. With guardrails to ensure colleges and universities maintain integrity, Canada could focus on welcoming students who pursue credentials (e.g., diplomas, degrees) in fields of study (e.g., STEM) that yield positive outcomes after graduation, including higher transition rates to permanent residency. (Rather than constantly revising a list of specific programs eligible for work permits after graduation—feeding into an image of instability.)

As the global population contracts and competition for immigration grows, reactive policies hurt Canada’s brand as a stable and desirable destination. Many Canadians acknowledge the need for immigration to fill labour market gaps, and most concerns about immigration are tied to capacity rather than culture or ideology. A revised immigration strategy with stable targets for both temporary and permanent residents, an international brand strategy, and investments in infrastructure and services can set Canada on a positive course.

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Canada’s economic prospects are threatened not just by external shocks and demanding neighbours; they’re up against a deepening asymmetry of federalism that makes a unified economic strategy harder to design, sell, and implement.

Different views among Ottawa, the provinces, and Indigenous governments over how to use natural resources, fund and deliver education, and stabilize a strained health-care system are pulling Canada further toward a patchwork of policy regimes just as it confronts tough trade talks with a more transactional United States and intensifying global competition. Constitutional tools that were once seen as last resorts—the notwithstanding clause, aggressive jurisdictional challenges, demands for exemptions from national regulations and standards, even provincial votes on autonomy—are becoming more commonplace, raising the odds that provinces and Indigenous groups will weaponize hard and soft vetoes on national priorities. One Canada, maybe, but many nations within.

The consequences for national unity are more serious than at any point since the 1990s because fragmentation now comes with cheerleaders and sponsors abroad. A divided global order gives foreign governments, activist networks, and corporate actors more opportunities to exploit jurisdictional tensions, whether by privileging particular provinces in supply-chain decisions, funding litigation and media campaigns around resource projects, or amplifying separatist narratives. For geopolitical rivals, anything that weakens Canada’s coherence as a U.S. ally and G7 partner could even become a feature, not a bug, as sub-national players and Indigenous rights-holders seek to express their voices more assertively over energy, climate, industrial policy, internal trade and, most critically, bilateral trade with the U.S.

Canada’s federation was designed to balance provincial autonomy with federal authority over certain shared concerns, including trade. But over time, the Charter of Rights and Freedoms has pulled the courts into the heart of that balance. The Charter gives individuals and groups—including Indigenous communities and provinces themselves—powerful tools to challenge federal or provincial legislation on rights grounds, forcing policy choices in areas like language, education, and social programs to survive constitutional scrutiny. In practice, this has extended the Supreme Court’s role as an arbiter of federal-provincial and Crown–Indigenous relations, as governments on all sides use the Charter not only to protect rights but also to constrain fiscal and regulatory initiatives they oppose.

Among those weapons, the most contentious is the notwithstanding clause. Once rarely invoked, the clause has been used or seriously threatened in recent years by Quebec, Ontario, Saskatchewan, and Alberta in disputes over language, religious symbols, election finance, labour rights, and education, signalling to voters that governments can bypass courts when rights protections collide with political objectives. 

The regional nature—and divergences—of Canada’s economy only serves to sharpen the competing interests of the provinces, each under a different threat from the Trump trade war and global divisions. Ontario’s economy remains anchored in autos and steel; British Columbia relies heavily on lumber and Asia-facing trade; Saskatchewan depends on canola and other agricultural exports; and Alberta’s prosperity hinges on oil and gas. Canada’s negotiating position struggled through much of 2025 as premiers tried to argue for their patch in Washington. They may reemerge as soon as CUSMA negotiations begin in earnest.

Bill C-5, the One Canadian Economy Act, and political backlash, has become a focal point for federal-provincial tensions over resource governance and Indigenous rights. The legislation allows the federal cabinet to declare projects—ports, pipelines, mines, dams—to be in the national interest and fast-track approvals. Provinces that resent federal intrusion into natural-resource jurisdiction view C-5 as Ottawa reaching over their heads, while many Indigenous groups see the act as a direct attack on their constitutionally protected right to be consulted and accommodated on decisions affecting their lands. The result is a wave of legal challenges and protests that further politicize big-ticket projects the Carney government counts on to diversify away from the United States.

In the wake of C-5, the Canada–Alberta Memorandum of Understanding on energy and climate is both a template for cooperation and a sign of how transactional federalism has become. The MOU commits Ottawa and Edmonton to work together on net-zero by 2050, build major transmission interties, streamline regulatory timelines to roughly two years, and negotiate equivalency agreements on carbon pricing and methane reductions by April 2026. It also sketches pathways for a new export pipeline and carbon capture infrastructure, with explicit references to Indigenous participation and economic benefit-sharing. But the fact that these national priorities are being handled on a project-by-project basis, with one province at a time, underlines how much of the Carney agenda now runs through bilateral deals rather than pan-Canadian frameworks, inviting other resource-rich provinces to demand similar side arrangements or carve-outs—and the growing urban parts of the country, where the ruling Liberals have their political base, to question if their own aspirations are being met, too.

The sleeping giant of Canada’s asymmetrical agitations is Crown–Indigenous relations that sit at the intersection of rights, resources, and legitimacy. Indigenous nations and communities have become sophisticated in their use of both the courts and direct action to halt or reshape major projects, winning injunctions, forcing governments back to the negotiating table, and mobilizing public opinion when they’ve deemed consultation to have been inadequate. B.C. First Nations pose a particular challenge, as they are central to both resource development and expanded exports to the Pacific—and they have different legal standing, given the province came into Confederation without treaties.

Under these pressures, several provinces and Ottawa have started to experiment with exemptions from environmental rules, electricity regulations, and interprovincial trade norms, and some are pushing to further decentralize immigration and demanding more respect for their jurisdiction over housing policies, which remains the country’s political hot potato. As a result, international investors are beginning to price Canadian federalism—once a quirky part of the Great White North—as an operational risk. “Can you get it done?” is still the global response to many Canadian proposals, whether it’s pipelines, mines or large export infrastructure. At the same time, some view this web of rights protections and multi-level consent requirements as a signal of rule-of-law robustness and social licence, especially compared with more arbitrary regimes. The balance between speed and certainty will be measured, in part, by how the Carney government navigates high-profile disputes over C-5 projects and the project commitments under the Canada-Alberta MOU.

The PMO’s highly centralized style is both an asset and a vulnerability. A strong prime ministerial centre can coordinate economic, climate, and foreign policy to respond quickly to U.S. shocks and mobilize federal spending behind a coherent industrial strategy. But governing through a tight PMO and bilateral deals with premiers risks sidelining intergovernmental forums and parliamentary scrutiny, feeding the narrative that Ottawa is imposing its will and prompting provinces to retaliate through the courts, the notwithstanding clause, or their own referendums on autonomy. That’s not to mention the risk of cabinet and caucus, especially in a fragile parliament. Any over-reliance on executive bargains could leave national policy dependent on a handful of political relationships rather than anchored in durable institutions.

The 2026 political calendar heightens the risk that constitutional and jurisdictional disputes move from background noise to full-blown flashpoints. A possible federal election, a scheduled Quebec election, and ongoing battles in Alberta and B.C. over resource policy, climate targets, and revenue-sharing all create incentives for leaders to campaign against Ottawa or against other provinces. This politics of permanent grievance erodes the goodwill necessary for joint economic projects. Without more signals of progress, the summertime meme of “elbows up” is at risk of melting into a wintertime mood of confidence down. 

Bridging these gaps will require a deliberate strategy of political choreography as much as policy design. Federal-provincial-territorial summits on health, housing, and climate can still set common baselines—but are always at risk of becoming provincial shakedowns of the federation. Advertising, public campaigns and town halls, led not only by the prime minister but also premiers, Indigenous leaders and CEOs, can further strengthen a shared narrative around a united and confident Canada. 

Regulatory reform will be a key test of whether the Carney government can use federal powers to unite the country. Efforts to reduce interprovincial trade barriers, harmonize or mutually recognize skills accreditation, and streamline immigration pathways for in-demand occupations all promise gains in productivity and labour mobility, but each step touches sensitive provincial prerogatives. The new cooperation mechanisms embedded in the Canada-Alberta MOU—single-window assessments, clear timelines, and equivalency agreements—offer a model that could, in theory, be extended to other provinces and sectors if trust can be built. Without such reforms, Canada risks leaving significant internal market efficiencies on the table just as it tries to compensate for a less reliable U.S. partner.

Businesses and investors should treat jurisdictional tensions as an enduring feature—and potential strength—of the Canadian landscape. The need to secure multi-level consent and navigate overlapping legal regimes raises transaction costs and lengthens project lead times, but it can also produce more resilient outcomes with stronger social licence and lessen the risk of abrupt reversals. For firms willing to invest in local relationships with provinces, Indigenous governments, and municipalities, Canada’s complex federalism can be a source of differentiated advantage, insulating long-term bets from the whims of any single political actor, including the U.S. The risk in 2026 is that escalating constitutional brinkmanship turns this complexity from a managed challenge into a systemic vulnerability—just when Canada needs a coherent, collective strategy to build a stronger economy, and country.

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By John Stackhouse

Tariffs don’t take a holiday and we can assume President Donald Trump won’t either.

Trump used his decorative holiday message to the nation this week to portray himself as a Santa Claus of trade:

  • Tariffs are one of his great achievements, saying it is bringing record investment to the U.S.

  • Tariffs will help pay for the “warrior dividend” to 1.45 million U.S. military personnel.

  • Tariffs are leading to lower prices.

We will see later in 2026 (hello, midterms) if Americans agree. But expect the President to charge into 2026 on a tariff high, even if, as expected, the Supreme Court rules that he’s overstepped his powers. How? The White House can quickly rebuild the tariff wall, using Section 122 and 301 powers that would keep tariffs in place, although the expected rate might drop from the current 16% average to perhaps 10%.

Three questions for the New Year:

  • Will countries look to retaliate, even with non-tariff barriers?

  • Can Congress afford to pass tax cuts and tariff cuts?

  • Can Canada afford to play for time?

Mark Carney seems resigned to the “no deal” scenario, and with it a long slog for CUSMA negotiations. The biggest near-term challenges will be around digital services, lumber and rules of origin for auto manufacturers, each with its own economic and political calculus:

  • expect the U.S. to continue to push for more concessions for online media, particularly for Meta, which could face blowback in Quebec where cultural protections (including subsidies for local media) will be a red line for an expected Parti Quebecois government in 2026;

  • expect the U.S., facing a soft housing market, to continue to hammer B.C. (and New Brunswick) with softwood lumber measures;

  • expect Doug Ford to push hard again for favourable access to the U.S. auto market for Ontario assembly plants. 

Canada is not likely to get all three. Which means Carney may spend the holidays thinking through the coal that Santa has in mind for 2026. 

14257: The Executive Order signed by U.S. President Donald Trump on April 2 that imposed a 10% baseline tariff on imports from all U.S. trading partners.

90: Countries slapped with a tariff rate above the baseline 10% on “Liberation Day.”

2: White House visits by Prime Minister Mark Carney. The most recent was in early October during which Trump called Carney a “good man” who is doing “a great job.”

75 million: Dollars spent by Doug Ford’s Ontario government on an anti-tariff ad campaign featuring Ronald Reagan, which prompted Trump to call off negotiations with Canada. Ford claims the ad clocked 12.4 billion views.

US$35 trillion: Estimated value of global goods trade in 2025. Trade volumes hit record highs even as geopolitics fractured supply chains—proof that globalization is rewiring, not retreating.

50,000: Fewer manufacturing jobs in the U.S. since the start of the year.

US$1 trillion: China’s record trade surplus despite tensions with the U.S. Beijing exported US$3.4 trillion worth of goods in the first 11 months of the year by finding, in part, new markets, including Africa (+26%), Southeast Asia (+14%) and Latin America (+7.1%).

5: The industries that accounted for 80%of tariffs the U.S. collected from Canada, namely auto (28.8%), aluminum (23.3%), iron and steel (12.7%), machinery (8.8%), articles of iron and steel (8.3%).

$70 billion: The United Arab Emirates’ investment pledge for Canada, focused on the development of critical minerals, energy, ports and AI.

US$226.4 billion: U.S. exports to Mexico between January and August—surpassing the US$225.6 billion goods shipped to Canada—marking the first time in 30 years Mexico overtook Canada as a top destinations for exports.

$200 billion: The estimated value of the Canadian Mutual Recognition Agreement, which eliminates all barriers to trading goods (except food) between Canadian provinces and territories.

3x: Increase in global trade-restrictive measures since 2019. Tariffs, export controls, and subsidies are now structural features of trade policy—not temporary shocks.

10%: The amount of lumber exports  (enough to build 75,000 homes) that Canada’s forestry industry is planning to re-route from the U.S. to the U.K. and Europe.

100%: U.S. reliance on imports for 16 critical minerals (including graphite), with more than 50% import dependence for another 29, including zinc, cobalt, and nickel.

$600 billion: Canada’s non-U.S. export goal by 2035, as outlined in the 2025 federal budget–doubling the current amount.

$50 billion: The potential value of a trade partnership between Canada and India, which have renewed relations this year.

$100 billion: The annual value of Canada’s agri-food exports. Roughly 60% was destined for U.S. markets.

$994.63: The amount the average family in Canada can expect to pay more in groceries in 2026, compared to 2025. The toll of tariffs is impacting domestic food security, with one in four Canadians experiencing food insecurity.

86: Percentage of goods the U.S. imported from Canada in September that were duty free.

51: Number of days gold prices closed higher than previous all-time highs due to heightened geo-economic uncertainty.

28%: The increase in coffee prices year-over-year.

19%: Decline in Chinese exports to the U.S. this year.

US$244 billion: Total tariff revenues the U.S. has collected (January to November 2025)

1 million bpd: The potential capacity of a West Coast oil export pipeline at the heart of an MoU between the federal government and Alberta that would expand Alberta’s oil exports to Asia.

US$7 billion: The massive hit Michigan’s Big Three automakers—General Motors, Ford and Stellantis—expect on their earnings in 2025 from U.S. tariffs.

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By Lisa Ashton, Director of Agriculture Policy, RBC Thought Leadership

U.S. President Donald Trump’s US$12 billion aid package for American farmers struggling with rising input costs like fertilizer and seeds comes with a sting for Canada. Trump is considering “very severe” tariffs on Canadian fertilizer to “bolster” U.S. domestic fertilizer production. 

This could prove to be an own goal for Washington. More tariffs on Canadian fertilizers are likely to raise prices for U.S. farmers in the short-term and could create volatility in securing long-term supply. The proposed move comes as the U.S. has few alternatives to Canadian fertilizer, while American farmers have limited leverage in the market and are price receivers. Here’s what is at stake for both the Canadian and U.S. agriculture sectors:

  • Canada accounts for 81% of U.S. potassium-based chemical fertilizer imports and tariffs would further raise costs along North America’s interconnected agri-food supply chain.1

  • The U.S. tried a version of this before: It imposed broad tariffs (25%) earlier this year on many Canadian imports, including potash and other fertilizers. After pushback from American farmers and industry groups, fertilizer tariffs were reduced to 10%.

  • Those moves proved to be a body blow as U.S. Import Price Index for chemical fertilizers rose from 164.5 in December 2024 to 186.5 in September 2025.2

    • The U.S. Prices Paid Index tracking costs paid by U.S. farmers rose to 149.9 in June 2025, up from 139.9 the year before. Over the same period, fertilizer costs were the primary driver for rising costs for U.S. crop farmers, up 11% in the index.3

  • Canada has the world’s largest potash reserves, with 1.1 billion tonnes of potash, which is 5x larger than U.S. reserves.4 Canada’s scale of potash mining by production volumes was 36x larger than the U.S. in 2024.5

  • Fertilizers account for roughly 30% to 45% of a U.S. farmer’s annual operating cost, depending on the crop.6 As farmers are vulnerable to volatility in input prices, they often can’t pass rising input costs onto consumers since many sell into commodity markets (i.e. corn, wheat, soybeans). That could challenge the U.S. administration’s efforts to reduce costs for farmers ahead of 2026 mid-terms with active tariffs on their inputs and threats of more.

  • The U.S. could carve out separate deals with Canada and Mexico says U.S. Trade Representative Jamieson Greer. He said the Trump administration is leaving all options on the table when it comes to the Canada-U.S.-Mexico Agreement (CUSMA). Mark Carney was quick to dismiss the possibility of separate deals: “That’s not what they’re saying.”

  • Kirsten Hillman, Canada’s ambassador to the U.S. who played a key role in the CUSMA negotiations, announced that she will step down in the New Year. Hillman’s replacement has yet to be announced but reports surfaced that Mark Wiseman, former chief executive of the Canada Pension Plan Investment Board, is the front-runner.

  • Canada’s $153-million trade surplus in September blew past analysts’ expectations of a $4.5-billion deficit. Exports to the U.S. rose 4.6% (imports fell 1.7%). And exports to other parts of the world shot up 18.6%.

  • In the U.S. exports surged in September, resulting in the smallest trade deficit in 5 years.

  • And China’s trade surplus tops US$1 trillion for the first time. Despite trade tensions with the U.S., Beijing exported US$3.4 trillion worth of goods in the first 11 months of the year by finding, in part, new markets for its outbound shipments, including Africa (+26%), Southeast Asia (+14%) and Latin America (+7.1%).

By Jordan Brennan, Managing Director, RBC Thought Leadership

President Trump has been making the point that tariffs carry with it short-term pain for long-term gain. The data confirms that he’s got the pain part right.

Inflation: Since Trump’s so-called ‘Liberation Day’ in April, producer prices in the U.S. have moved meaningfully higher. The knock-on-effect: consumer inflation has grown for five consecutive months and now stands at 3%—a level not seen since early 2024.

Producer and Consumer prices march higher since liberation day

Consumer sentiment: According to the University of Michigan’s long-running survey of consumers, confidence is sitting at half-century lows. Four of the 10 worst monthly readings have come since Liberation Day.

Manufacturing: Far from rebounding, manufacturing employment—including politically-sensitive auto jobs—has worsened since January. The U.S. has shed nearly 50,000 manufacturing jobs this year.

U.S. Manufacturing Employment Deteriorates in 2025

The rejoinder from the White House is inevitably that the tariff policy takes time and discomfort is transitional. But voters rarely reward distant promises over immediate pain. And Trump has already started to ease off, recently slashing tariffs on beef, coffee and assortment of other grocery-store items. Expect more selective tariff relief—targeted by region and by product—as the midterms draw closer.

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Also in this week’s edition: How five tariff-exposed industries in Canada are faring

By Shaz Merwat, Energy Policy Lead

As U.S. President Donald Trump hosted Prime Minister Mark Carney and Mexico’s President Claudia Sheinbaum, energy issues loomed in the background amid U.S. concerns about structural deficits in heavy crude. Historically, Canadian barrels competed with Venezuelan heavy crude in key U.S. refining markets—primarily the U.S. Midwest and the Gulf Coast. While Venezuelan volumes have been largely absent for the past decade, shifting U.S. foreign-policy signals suggest that competition could re-emerge.

Why it matters — Trump cannot unwind two core U.S. dependencies

Despite efforts to reshape U.S. supply chains, Washington remains structurally dependent on two things it cannot easily substitute: Canadian heavy crude and Chinese rare earths. Heavy crude is foundational to U.S. refining capacity, and as it stands, the U.S. cannot easily replace Canadian supply: domestic production is overwhelmingly light, and heavy-crude alternatives from Mexico and Venezuela have structurally declined.

These twin constraints limit U.S. leverage and elevate the importance of stable, long-term supply partners. Alberta’s Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) arrives at a moment when U.S. policymakers must balance geopolitical objectives—such as renewed attention on Venezuela—with the reality that Canadian barrels remain irreplaceable in the refinery system.

By the numbers — the heavy-barrel shortfall

  • Mexico: U.S. bound heavy-crude exports have fallen from as high as ~1.7 mb/d in 2005-2006 to roughly ~0.40 mb/d today.

  • Venezuela: heavy-crude exports to the U.S. surpassed 1.5 mb/d in the early 2000s; today U.S. exports are ~0.1 mb/d.

  • Canada: The dominant exporter to the U.S., with around four million barrels of crude shipped south of the border daily. The Canada-Alberta MoU proposed 1 million bpd pipeline, plus 300,000–400,000 bpd from Trans Mountain together create a sizeable uplift in export capacity—primarily oriented toward Asia.

The bigger picture — if Venezuela returns, does Canada lose leverage?

A Venezuelan “return” would likely be slow, expensive and politically fragile. Refinery contracts, debt obligations and upstream infrastructure all require rebuilding. Even under a regime change, investors will demand decade-long stability before committing capital.

Mexico faces similar limits: Sheinbaum inherits state-owned Pemex’s declining production and mounting debt, meaning a rapid restoration of heavy-crude exports is unlikely.

This leaves Canada as the only credible, scalable source of heavy supply. The MoU’s accelerated timelines—carbon-pricing equivalency, methane rules and Pathways carbon capture, utilization and storage project—signal Ottawa and Edmonton are preparing for sustained output growth.

Bottom line — the MoU prepares Canada for a more competitive heavy-oil landscape

As Canada builds westward capacity through TMX and the proposed 1 million bpd pipeline, more barrels are positioned for Asia rather than the U.S. That shift inevitably forces U.S. policymakers to consider how they will secure heavy-crude supply in the coming decade—including whether to re-engage Venezuela in a more meaningful way.

For Canada, today, this is less of a challenge. The MoU ensures that, regardless of how U.S. policy evolves, producers have diversified market access and greater resilience. If Venezuelan volumes rise, Canada will have optionality; if they do not, Canada remains the primary supplier to U.S. refiners.

Either way, the middle of the next decade is shaping up to be a far more dynamic heavy-oil environment—and the MoU positions Canada to navigate it from a position of strength.

  • Canada entered the trade war in better shape than previously thought. StatsCan revised GDP for each of the past three years up by about half a point.

  • The Canadian government served automaker Stellantis a notice of default for shifting production of the Jeep Compass from Brampton, Ont., to Illinois despite receiving hundreds of millions in incentives in recent years. “Stellantis is on the hook,” said Industry Minister Mélanie Joly. “Defending these jobs means defending Canada’s economic backbone.”

  • While speaking to business leaders in Ottawa, Japan’s Ambassador to Canada Kanji Yamanouchi noted the role energy could play in future Canada-Japan relations. “If we need energy from a county which is difficult to trust or the country which we can trust,” he said, “it’s much better for us to have trade with a country with trust.”

  • Despite $500 million in government loans, Algoma Steel is laying off 1,050 workers from its plant in Sault Ste. Marie, Ont., in the face of “extraordinary and external market forces.”

The RBC Economics team did a deep dive this week: ‘Tracking the impact of U.S. tariffs on five targeted Canadian industries.’

Overall, we track moderately lower manufacturing production and employment in most of the highly tariffed sectors in Canada. These trends have also been much less volatile than international trade flow, that were heavily distorted around when tariffs were implemented (as U.S. importers front-ran purchases to build pre-tariff inventories in Q1.)

Selling prices among Canadian manufacturers have generally held up, with foreign buyers paying the bulk of initial tariff costs, but have led to declining U.S. corporate profits this year. We haven’t seen systemically higher U.S. consumer prices but still expect those will show up more significantly in 2026.

Here’s a breakdown of how five key Canadian industries have fared in their production, employment and selling prices, amid rising U.S. tariffs.

Read the full report here.

In a recent episode of Disruptors, John Stackhouse takes listeners to Quebec to meet former premier Jean Charest and Eric Desaulniers, founder & CEO of Nouveau Monde Graphite. Together, they explore how a new graphite mine at Matawinie and an integrated refining plant at Bécancour aim to connect the full chain from rock to anode material in one province—and what that could mean for Canada’s role as a trusted supplier of critical minerals to its G7 allies.

From China’s dominance in graphite refining to Quebec’s push for all‑electric mining fleets powered by hydro, this episode looks at how Canada can move from “quarry” to strategic partner in a re‑wired global economy.

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The Canada-Alberta Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) sets the stage for the province to become a continental energy superpower across both traditional and non-traditional energy forms. A key piece of the MoU centres around a bitumen pipeline project provided Alberta proceeds with several low-carbon projects and programs in parallel.

As it stands, the province’s major projects inventory consists of almost 1,000 projects valued at $167 billion. Incorporating a new major bitumen pipeline, plus meaningful growth in data centres and accompanying power generation and distribution, could raise that figure to more than $400 billion.

Here are five themes that stood out to us from the MoU:

1. A clear roadmap: The level of specificity within the document gives the MoU teeth. Unlike most MoUs that usually focus on outlining broad contours of areas of co-operation, this MoU sets out clear guidelines and targets.

2. Tight deadlines: The accelerated timelines suggest an urgency that puts the onus on Alberta to deliver, quickly, on several climate policies in order to secure expansion of its fossil fuel sector. Most of the key action items required on the Alberta side (carbon pricing equivalency, methane equivalency, tri-lateral Pathways MoU) have an April 1, 2026, deadline. It also brings an urgency in British Columbia where Premier David Eby would have to make some quick decisions on a new pipeline (and the proposed expansion of Trans Mountain pipeline) across his province.

3. A new bitumen pipeline: The success of the MoU, especially in the context of a new, large bitumen pipeline, revolves around the historically challenged duty to consult and the Build Canada Act to bypass future legal challenges, which at this point appear almost certain.

4. A 700,000-bpd proposition:
The Alberta government is expected to remain the central pipeline proponent until all parties—including Indigenous groups— are on board to reduce the possibility of delays and cost overruns that has plagued past pipeline expansions. In the nearer to mid-term (next five years), pipeline expansions across Enbridge’s Mainline and the federal government-owned Trans Mountain will add up to 600,000 to 700,000 barrels per day in added capacity, which should be enough to support growth for the remainder of this decade.

5. Low-carbon boost: The space given to non-oil and gas commentary such as a substantial expansion of power generation for traditional heavy industry, but also around data centres, interties, and domestic supply chain capture (e.g., Canadian steel and pipeline), suggests that the federal government is creating linkages to ensure a potential Alberta boom cascades across industries and provinces.

What’s being overlooked:

  • The increase in Alberta’s TIER price to $130 per tonne does not specify a date. The Canadian federal benchmark was set to cross that threshold in 2027/2028. Current Alberta TIER prices have since risen to $25-27/tonne (from $17-18/tonne just a couple weeks ago) according to RBC’s Environmental Markets trading desk, implying a 5x return if prices reach the threshold level;

  • The MoU makes specific reference to include enhanced oil recovery (EOR) as part of an extension of existing federal investment tax credits for carbon sequestration, utilization and storage (CCUS). The economic uplift from the ability to monetize the additional oil stream can be meaningful. According to a University of Calgary study, certain Alberta EOR-CCUS reservoirs are economically viable at a carbon price of $60/tonne. In comparison, a Colorado School of Mines study suggests that in the U.S. allowing EOR within the 45Q tax credit— designed to accelerate carbon capture, utilization and storage—could provide an additional economic benefit of between US$95-$120 per tonne of CO2e.

  • Both the construction of a bitumen pipeline and construction of the oilsands-led Pathways carbon capture, utilization and storage (CCUS) project are preconditions of one another. Yet, that precondition is dependent upon the commencement of ”Pathways Phase 1 Projects” (22-million tonnes out of Pathways’ total 50-million tonne capacity). It’s unclear if that references the sequestering (12 million tonnes) or emissions reductions (10 million tonnes) initiatives.


    Shaz Merwat is Energy Policy Lead at RBC Thought Leadership

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By John Stackhouse

The much-pilloried Canada-U.S.-Mexico trade agreement was signed seven years ago this weekend—on November 30, 2018. A year later, it was amended to address rules of origin for autos, digital trade, IP, dairy and, who could forget, a sunset clause. 

We can all do the math. The December 10, 2019 amendments set in motion a 16-year term for the agreement, with a mandatory review every six years. Which means we’ll see more of a requiem than a birthday bash next week when Mark Carney is in Washington to help kick off the 2026 FIFA World Cup. 

But don’t bury CUSMA just yet.

Despite the U.S. President’s freeze on negotiations, officials from both countries are talking every day and laying the groundwork for what will be an intense 2026. Not many insiders seriously expect CUSMA to go away; they’re working on changes—modifications, enhancements, renovations, depending on your point of view—that will continue to change the fabric of continental commerce.

Here’s what’s worth noting about CUSMA and its first five years (as it didn’t come into effect until 2020):

  • Canada-U.S. trade in goods is up about 23%;

  • Canada remains the U.S.’s top customer, buying US$440 billion of goods and services in 2024, or 14% of America’s exports;

  • U.S. direct investment in Canada hit $684 billion last year, up from about $400 billion; 

  • Canadian direct investment in the U.S. has doubled to $1.3 trillion;

  • between 2020-2024, automakers announced nearly US$175 billion in new investment in North American production, as they reshored supply chains to meet those rules of origin.

  • Canada-U.S. energy and agri-food trade has also surged in the 2020s, thanks in part to the certainty delivered by CUSMA. Energy is our biggest export to the U.S. — by far — worth $170 billion in 2024, up 50% from 2018.  

That energy number may be the biggest message Carney takes to Washington. Not by coincidence, he locked arms this week with Alberta Premier Danielle Smith to state boldly to Canadians, and the world, that the country will be exporting a lot more oil to Asia. The U.S. government, and many U.S. shippers, would prefer that crude flow south. But now Carney, with Smith’s help, can exert more leverage in his Washington trade talks.

Canada always tried to keep energy (and water) off the main trade table, which is focussed more on manufacturing. But in this new age of energy security, it may be what Canada needs more than ever to bend the ball like Beckham.

  • Canada will slap 25% tariffs on about $10 billion worth of steel imports starting December 26, to support a domestic industry that has been battered by U.S. tariffs and cheap Chinese steel.

  • Canada Inc. is shrugging off tariffs. Operating profits of Canadian corporations rose 3.8% (the fastest pace of growth in two years) to $200 billion in the third quarter, according to Statistics Canada.

  • The U.S. will export a record 10.7 million tonnes (+40% YoY) of liquefied natural gas (LNG) in November, which is expected to drive down the price of gas in Asia and Europe over the winter.

  • Though relations remain chilly, Mark Carney confirmed that he spoke to Donald Trump this week—but he wouldn’t say if they talked trade. “I don’t want to over signal things…they haven’t re-engaged yet,” said Canada’s PM, who will be in Washington next week for a World Cup event alongside the U.S. President.

  • India is looking to both ramp up trade with Mexico and be spared the tariffs that President Claudia Sheinbaum plans to levy on a number of Asian countries.

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In this week’s edition: The opportunities for Canada in Latin America and how Canadian exports of pulses provide valuable lessons when it comes to trade diversification

By John Stackhouse

Canada’s trade diversification menu seems to consist of East Asia and Western Europe, with a side dish of Middle Eastern and South Asian economies.

What happened to Latin America?

Sure, the prime minister and his senior team are all over Mexico — largely though as part of their North American trade strategy. The much bigger economic hemisphere south of the Rio Grande still beckons.

This week, the Canadian Council for the Americas published a significant policy paper on how Canada can position itself for the decade ahead in South America, Central America and the Caribbean. 

The region’s GDP is roughly $6 trillion, more than double Canada’s and more than double what it was 20 years ago. And yet Canadian exports in 2024 were a modest $18.6 billion, down nearly 11% that year as agri-food shipments got hammered by trade disruptions. 

Looking ahead, there are dozens of markets to consider, but just focussing on the Big Five—Brazil, Mexico, Chile, Colombia, Peru—would access a combined population of nearly 500 million people, half of them middle class.

We’ve spent the past 25 years negotiating and announcing Free Trade Agreements in Latin America. Most did much less than was promised. One illustration: we have $24 billion of investment in Chile, and less than $1 billion in exports. Now we need to be more strategic.

The CCA report suggests:

  • develop consortium approaches to infrastructure, to help fill the region’s $150 billion infrastructure gap

  • focus on energy (LNG), machinery, pipelines, digital systems, and mining technology

  • target machinery and equipment (buses, tunnelling equipment) for megaprojects

  • develop critical minerals partnerships, including processing

  • get more sophisticated with labour mobility, as we’ll need a lot more students, skilled workers, professionals and entrepreneurs from the region

  • step up as a security partner, helping with defence and security tech, including in space

An age of America First doesn’t need to mean Americas Last.

Check out the full report here.

  • Mark Carney wrapped up his visit to Abu Dhabi by announcing a $70-billion investment from the United Arab Emirates–the money is expected to go towards the development of critical minerals, energy, ports and AI.

  • U.S. Ambassador to Canada linked purchase of F-35s to trade talks. Pete Hoekstra said that Canada needs to “harmonize” with the U.S. on some key economic and military issues to get back to the negotiating table. He specifically referenced the federal government’s F-35 fighter jet review.

  • The U.S. exported more to Mexico than Canada for the first time in 30 years. New trade data showed that US$226.4 billion of American goods went to Mexico between January and August this year, compared to the US$225.6 billion worth that crossed into Canada. While the ongoing trade tensions between Canada and the U.S. is one factor, the gap has been narrowing for years.

  • The Canadian Mutual Recognition Agreement, which eliminates all barriers to trading goods (except food) between provinces and territories, was signed this week and takes effect in December. The government estimates that it could drive $200 billion worth of value.

  • The European Union is looking to Australia and considering a similar strategy to the one the U.S. has taken when it comes to critical minerals and rare earths: invest directly in the mining companies.

Services now make up nearly a quarter of Canada’s exports and have delivered 62% of total real exports growth since 2014. Services trade hold a key to diversification—they are less exposed to tariffs, more resilient to economic downturns, and are already more diversified with exports almost 50/50 split between U.S. and non-U.S. markets, compared to goods exports, 75% of which flow south of the border. (Read RBC Economics full report here).

By Lisa Ashton, Director of Agricultural Policy

Pulses, of which Canada is the number one exporter globally, is a powerful example of how Canada can deliver on its ambitions to diversify its trading partners beyond the U.S. It’s all about building the right trading relationships and investing in logistics and food-standard alignment where markets are growing.

Why it matters:

  • The 2025 federal budget outlines a plan to grow Canada’s trade with the world, including a goal to double Canada’s non-U.S. goods exports to $600 billion by 2035.

  • Specific to agri-food, the Canadian Food Inspection Agency (CFIA) is receiving funding to modernize it trade tools and work with trading partners to expand market access for Canadian agri-food products.

  • Diversification is easier said than done. The U.S. accounted for over 60% of Canada agri-food export value in 2024, making Canada the least diverse when it comes to trading partners among top agri-food exporters.

  • But Canada’s agri-food sector is staking its claim as a global leader in pulses. These pulses are destined for markets far beyond the U.S.

By the numbers:

  • Canadian pulses account for roughly 24% of global trade. For dried lentil and peas, Canada’s top markets include countries in South Asia and West Asia including India, Turkey, and the UAE as well as South America, including Columbia and Peru. Canada’s dried peas and lentils, examples of Canada’s pulses boom, export value in 2024 was nearly $4 billion.

  • The EU and Indo-Pacific are expected to increase annual consumption by 11% and 14%, respectively, over the next decade, providing growing market opportunities in Canada’s target markets identified in Budget 2025. 

  • To meet global demand, Canada’s pea and lentil production volumes have increased by roughly 73% and 393%, respectively, over the past 25 years. Pulses are an important crop in a farmers’ rotation, fixing nitrogen in soils, reducing the need for fertilizer application.

The bigger picture:

  • Global pulse consumption is expected to rise by 15% over the next decade.

  • Global production is led by Asia and Africa with annual growth in product at roughly 3%. India is the single largest producer accounting for 29% of global production with most of their production being used for domestic consumption. 

  • China is the largest importer of pulses, accounting for about 13% of global trade.

  • The U.S., Turkey and Ukraine follow Canada in exports of dried peas. But Canada, maintains a strong lead, exporting volumes that are 5 times that of the U.S.

Bottomline:

Canada’s approach to diversifying goods exports to non-U.S. markets can learn from the Canadian pulse experience of expanded domestic production, efficiently navigating international trade logistics, and diversification in growth markets where demand is expected to continue to rise. 

References: OECD-FAO: OECD-FAO Agricultural Outlook, 2025; OECD. OECD Agriculture statistics (database), 2025; UN COMTRADE. Trade Data, 2025.

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In this week’s edition: North America’s Critical Minerals Moment — and Canada’s Strategic Role

By John Stackhouse

A few years ago, Saudi Arabia and Canada were barely on speaking terms. Now they’re exploring trade deals, investment opportunities and, if plans come together, a visit to the Kingdom next year by Mark Carney.

In the Age of Trump, they’re among a host of mid-sized powers that are looking to carve out a new economic and geopolitical path.

Here’s what could redefine the Saudi-Canadian relationship: energy, including renewables, nuclear and EVs; advanced manufacturing, including drones and satellites; AI and quantum; mining and critical minerals; and advanced education and health care. The two countries also have a lot of capital to deploy, and a lot of capital that they need.

The rapidly evolving relationship was on display earlier this month when Saudi Investment Minister Khalid Al-Falih spent a day in Ottawa, with Carney and a range of senior ministers, and then a day on Bay Street. Less noticed but also important was Alberta Premier. Danielle Smith’s visit to the region, including Saudi Arabia, to promote energy technology and investment.

Here’s some of what may be worth watching in the coming months:

  • Carney’s pitch for $1 trillion+ in new investment (most of it private capital) will need to include sources like Saudi investment funds and corporates;

  • Saudi’s ambitions to diversify its energy sector—Al-Falih mentioned green and blue hydrogen, green ammonia and EVs—could use a lot more Canadian technology, talent and investment. The visiting Saudis met with Ontario autoparts makers, hoping they might want to be part of the Saudi ambition to make 600,000 EVs a year;

  • Canadian manufacturers and producers, especially in agri-food, can be leading players in Saudi’s ambition to be a food hub for the Middle East and North Africa.

  • Ottawa is hoping to restart trade talks with India under a “new process,” said Canadian Trade Minister Maninder Sidhu. On a three-day visit to India, the Minister discussed critical minerals, clean energy, agriculture and artificial intelligence.

  • In an effort to lower grocery bills, U.S. President Donald Trump is working lower tariffs on items like coffee and bananas into deals with a handful of Latin American countries. 

  • The price of pasta from Italy, however, could skyrocket for Americans come January when the proposed 107% tariff on goods from 13 Italian companies is scheduled to begin.

  • Canada’s forestry industry is planning to re-route about 10% of wood (enough to build 75,000 homes) that would normally go to the U.S. to the UK and Europe.

  • Amazon and Microsoft threw their support behind the Gain AI Act, legislation that would require chip makers to satisfy U.S. demand before exporting to other countries, including China. Nvidia, which has been seeking access to the world’s second largest economy, view the act as an unnecessary intervention.

By Shaz Merwat, Director of Energy Policy

A recent submission to U.S. Trade Representative Jamieson Greer from the Coalition for North American Trade (CNAT)—co-chaired by former U.S. House Ways and Means Chairman Kevin Brady, Canada’s former NAFTA lead negotiator Steve Verheul, and Mexico’s Ken Ramos—positions CUSMA as one of the continent’s most powerful tools for rebuilding critical-minerals security.

Key details from the filing:

  • The U.S. remains 100 percent import-reliant for 16 critical minerals (including graphite) and over 50 percent reliant for another 29 such as rare earths, zinc, cobalt, and nickel.

  • Canada is the U.S.’s primary import source for indium, nickel, potash, tellurium, uranium, vanadium, and zinc—and the second largest for copper, graphite, niobium, and tungsten.

The CNAT submission argues the CUSMA’s tariff-free architecture and co-production model are the ideal platform to accelerate re- and near-shoring of critical-minerals supply chains—from exploration and permitting to processing, refining, and battery-grade materials. Integrating Canada’s resource base with U.S. manufacturing strength and Mexico’s processing capacity fills a gap in critical-minerals collaboration to date, with most of the focus on G7+ allies.

For Canada, the strategic opening lies in deepening trilateral integration—leveraging CUSMA to attract investment, expand value-added processing, and align upstream resources with the broader North American production system to build a fully regional critical-minerals platform.