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RBC Thought Leadership Geopolitics, Trade and the Economy Page 5

Top Risks 2026: The Charter Strikes Back

Category: Geopolitics, Trade and the Economy

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This is a part of RBC Thought Leadership and Eurasia Group’s joint report

Canada’s economic prospects are threatened not just by external shocks and demanding neighbours; they’re up against a deepening asymmetry of federalism that makes a unified economic strategy harder to design, sell, and implement.

Different views among Ottawa, the provinces, and Indigenous governments over how to use natural resources, fund and deliver education, and stabilize a strained health-care system are pulling Canada further toward a patchwork of policy regimes just as it confronts tough trade talks with a more transactional United States and intensifying global competition. Constitutional tools that were once seen as last resorts—the notwithstanding clause, aggressive jurisdictional challenges, demands for exemptions from national regulations and standards, even provincial votes on autonomy—are becoming more commonplace, raising the odds that provinces and Indigenous groups will weaponize hard and soft vetoes on national priorities. One Canada, maybe, but many nations within.

The consequences for national unity are more serious than at any point since the 1990s because fragmentation now comes with cheerleaders and sponsors abroad. A divided global order gives foreign governments, activist networks, and corporate actors more opportunities to exploit jurisdictional tensions, whether by privileging particular provinces in supply-chain decisions, funding litigation and media campaigns around resource projects, or amplifying separatist narratives. For geopolitical rivals, anything that weakens Canada’s coherence as a U.S. ally and G7 partner could even become a feature, not a bug, as sub-national players and Indigenous rights-holders seek to express their voices more assertively over energy, climate, industrial policy, internal trade and, most critically, bilateral trade with the U.S.

Canada’s federation was designed to balance provincial autonomy with federal authority over certain shared concerns, including trade. But over time, the Charter of Rights and Freedoms has pulled the courts into the heart of that balance. The Charter gives individuals and groups—including Indigenous communities and provinces themselves—powerful tools to challenge federal or provincial legislation on rights grounds, forcing policy choices in areas like language, education, and social programs to survive constitutional scrutiny. In practice, this has extended the Supreme Court’s role as an arbiter of federal-provincial and Crown–Indigenous relations, as governments on all sides use the Charter not only to protect rights but also to constrain fiscal and regulatory initiatives they oppose.

Among those weapons, the most contentious is the notwithstanding clause. Once rarely invoked, the clause has been used or seriously threatened in recent years by Quebec, Ontario, Saskatchewan, and Alberta in disputes over language, religious symbols, election finance, labour rights, and education, signalling to voters that governments can bypass courts when rights protections collide with political objectives. 

The regional nature—and divergences—of Canada’s economy only serves to sharpen the competing interests of the provinces, each under a different threat from the Trump trade war and global divisions. Ontario’s economy remains anchored in autos and steel; British Columbia relies heavily on lumber and Asia-facing trade; Saskatchewan depends on canola and other agricultural exports; and Alberta’s prosperity hinges on oil and gas. Canada’s negotiating position struggled through much of 2025 as premiers tried to argue for their patch in Washington. They may reemerge as soon as CUSMA negotiations begin in earnest.

Bill C-5, the One Canadian Economy Act, and political backlash, has become a focal point for federal-provincial tensions over resource governance and Indigenous rights. The legislation allows the federal cabinet to declare projects—ports, pipelines, mines, dams—to be in the national interest and fast-track approvals. Provinces that resent federal intrusion into natural-resource jurisdiction view C-5 as Ottawa reaching over their heads, while many Indigenous groups see the act as a direct attack on their constitutionally protected right to be consulted and accommodated on decisions affecting their lands. The result is a wave of legal challenges and protests that further politicize big-ticket projects the Carney government counts on to diversify away from the United States.

In the wake of C-5, the Canada–Alberta Memorandum of Understanding on energy and climate is both a template for cooperation and a sign of how transactional federalism has become. The MOU commits Ottawa and Edmonton to work together on net-zero by 2050, build major transmission interties, streamline regulatory timelines to roughly two years, and negotiate equivalency agreements on carbon pricing and methane reductions by April 2026. It also sketches pathways for a new export pipeline and carbon capture infrastructure, with explicit references to Indigenous participation and economic benefit-sharing. But the fact that these national priorities are being handled on a project-by-project basis, with one province at a time, underlines how much of the Carney agenda now runs through bilateral deals rather than pan-Canadian frameworks, inviting other resource-rich provinces to demand similar side arrangements or carve-outs—and the growing urban parts of the country, where the ruling Liberals have their political base, to question if their own aspirations are being met, too.

The sleeping giant of Canada’s asymmetrical agitations is Crown–Indigenous relations that sit at the intersection of rights, resources, and legitimacy. Indigenous nations and communities have become sophisticated in their use of both the courts and direct action to halt or reshape major projects, winning injunctions, forcing governments back to the negotiating table, and mobilizing public opinion when they’ve deemed consultation to have been inadequate. B.C. First Nations pose a particular challenge, as they are central to both resource development and expanded exports to the Pacific—and they have different legal standing, given the province came into Confederation without treaties.

Under these pressures, several provinces and Ottawa have started to experiment with exemptions from environmental rules, electricity regulations, and interprovincial trade norms, and some are pushing to further decentralize immigration and demanding more respect for their jurisdiction over housing policies, which remains the country’s political hot potato. As a result, international investors are beginning to price Canadian federalism—once a quirky part of the Great White North—as an operational risk. “Can you get it done?” is still the global response to many Canadian proposals, whether it’s pipelines, mines or large export infrastructure. At the same time, some view this web of rights protections and multi-level consent requirements as a signal of rule-of-law robustness and social licence, especially compared with more arbitrary regimes. The balance between speed and certainty will be measured, in part, by how the Carney government navigates high-profile disputes over C-5 projects and the project commitments under the Canada-Alberta MOU.

The PMO’s highly centralized style is both an asset and a vulnerability. A strong prime ministerial centre can coordinate economic, climate, and foreign policy to respond quickly to U.S. shocks and mobilize federal spending behind a coherent industrial strategy. But governing through a tight PMO and bilateral deals with premiers risks sidelining intergovernmental forums and parliamentary scrutiny, feeding the narrative that Ottawa is imposing its will and prompting provinces to retaliate through the courts, the notwithstanding clause, or their own referendums on autonomy. That’s not to mention the risk of cabinet and caucus, especially in a fragile parliament. Any over-reliance on executive bargains could leave national policy dependent on a handful of political relationships rather than anchored in durable institutions.

The 2026 political calendar heightens the risk that constitutional and jurisdictional disputes move from background noise to full-blown flashpoints. A possible federal election, a scheduled Quebec election, and ongoing battles in Alberta and B.C. over resource policy, climate targets, and revenue-sharing all create incentives for leaders to campaign against Ottawa or against other provinces. This politics of permanent grievance erodes the goodwill necessary for joint economic projects. Without more signals of progress, the summertime meme of “elbows up” is at risk of melting into a wintertime mood of confidence down. 

Bridging these gaps will require a deliberate strategy of political choreography as much as policy design. Federal-provincial-territorial summits on health, housing, and climate can still set common baselines—but are always at risk of becoming provincial shakedowns of the federation. Advertising, public campaigns and town halls, led not only by the prime minister but also premiers, Indigenous leaders and CEOs, can further strengthen a shared narrative around a united and confident Canada. 

Regulatory reform will be a key test of whether the Carney government can use federal powers to unite the country. Efforts to reduce interprovincial trade barriers, harmonize or mutually recognize skills accreditation, and streamline immigration pathways for in-demand occupations all promise gains in productivity and labour mobility, but each step touches sensitive provincial prerogatives. The new cooperation mechanisms embedded in the Canada-Alberta MOU—single-window assessments, clear timelines, and equivalency agreements—offer a model that could, in theory, be extended to other provinces and sectors if trust can be built. Without such reforms, Canada risks leaving significant internal market efficiencies on the table just as it tries to compensate for a less reliable U.S. partner.

Businesses and investors should treat jurisdictional tensions as an enduring feature—and potential strength—of the Canadian landscape. The need to secure multi-level consent and navigate overlapping legal regimes raises transaction costs and lengthens project lead times, but it can also produce more resilient outcomes with stronger social licence and lessen the risk of abrupt reversals. For firms willing to invest in local relationships with provinces, Indigenous governments, and municipalities, Canada’s complex federalism can be a source of differentiated advantage, insulating long-term bets from the whims of any single political actor, including the U.S. The risk in 2026 is that escalating constitutional brinkmanship turns this complexity from a managed challenge into a systemic vulnerability—just when Canada needs a coherent, collective strategy to build a stronger economy, and country.

Download the Report

Contributors to the RBC Thought Leadership and Eurasia Group’s joint report:  

Gerald M. Butts: Vice Chairman and Senior Advisor, Eurasia Group

Graeme Thompson: Senior Analyst/Global Macro, Eurasia Group

John Stackhouse: Senior Vice President, RBC Thought Leadership, Office of the CEO

John Intini: Senior Director, Editorial, RBC Thought Leadership

Yadullah Hussain: Managing Editor, RBC Thought Leadership

Jackie Pichette: Policy Lead, Skills and Higher Education, RBC Thought Leadership

Shaz Merwat: Policy Lead, Energy, RBC Thought Leadership

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What’s in store for Carney & Canada in 2026?

By John Stackhouse

Tariffs don’t take a holiday and we can assume President Donald Trump won’t either.

Trump used his decorative holiday message to the nation this week to portray himself as a Santa Claus of trade:

  • Tariffs are one of his great achievements, saying it is bringing record investment to the U.S.

  • Tariffs will help pay for the “warrior dividend” to 1.45 million U.S. military personnel.

  • Tariffs are leading to lower prices.

We will see later in 2026 (hello, midterms) if Americans agree. But expect the President to charge into 2026 on a tariff high, even if, as expected, the Supreme Court rules that he’s overstepped his powers. How? The White House can quickly rebuild the tariff wall, using Section 122 and 301 powers that would keep tariffs in place, although the expected rate might drop from the current 16% average to perhaps 10%.

Three questions for the New Year:

  • Will countries look to retaliate, even with non-tariff barriers?

  • Can Congress afford to pass tax cuts and tariff cuts?

  • Can Canada afford to play for time?

Mark Carney seems resigned to the “no deal” scenario, and with it a long slog for CUSMA negotiations. The biggest near-term challenges will be around digital services, lumber and rules of origin for auto manufacturers, each with its own economic and political calculus:

  • expect the U.S. to continue to push for more concessions for online media, particularly for Meta, which could face blowback in Quebec where cultural protections (including subsidies for local media) will be a red line for an expected Parti Quebecois government in 2026;

  • expect the U.S., facing a soft housing market, to continue to hammer B.C. (and New Brunswick) with softwood lumber measures;

  • expect Doug Ford to push hard again for favourable access to the U.S. auto market for Ontario assembly plants. 

Canada is not likely to get all three. Which means Carney may spend the holidays thinking through the coal that Santa has in mind for 2026. 

25 numbers that defined ’25

14257: The Executive Order signed by U.S. President Donald Trump on April 2 that imposed a 10% baseline tariff on imports from all U.S. trading partners.

90: Countries slapped with a tariff rate above the baseline 10% on “Liberation Day.”

2: White House visits by Prime Minister Mark Carney. The most recent was in early October during which Trump called Carney a “good man” who is doing “a great job.”

75 million: Dollars spent by Doug Ford’s Ontario government on an anti-tariff ad campaign featuring Ronald Reagan, which prompted Trump to call off negotiations with Canada. Ford claims the ad clocked 12.4 billion views.

US$35 trillion: Estimated value of global goods trade in 2025. Trade volumes hit record highs even as geopolitics fractured supply chains—proof that globalization is rewiring, not retreating.

50,000: Fewer manufacturing jobs in the U.S. since the start of the year.

US$1 trillion: China’s record trade surplus despite tensions with the U.S. Beijing exported US$3.4 trillion worth of goods in the first 11 months of the year by finding, in part, new markets, including Africa (+26%), Southeast Asia (+14%) and Latin America (+7.1%).

5: The industries that accounted for 80%of tariffs the U.S. collected from Canada, namely auto (28.8%), aluminum (23.3%), iron and steel (12.7%), machinery (8.8%), articles of iron and steel (8.3%).

$70 billion: The United Arab Emirates’ investment pledge for Canada, focused on the development of critical minerals, energy, ports and AI.

US$226.4 billion: U.S. exports to Mexico between January and August—surpassing the US$225.6 billion goods shipped to Canada—marking the first time in 30 years Mexico overtook Canada as a top destinations for exports.

$200 billion: The estimated value of the Canadian Mutual Recognition Agreement, which eliminates all barriers to trading goods (except food) between Canadian provinces and territories.

3x: Increase in global trade-restrictive measures since 2019. Tariffs, export controls, and subsidies are now structural features of trade policy—not temporary shocks.

10%: The amount of lumber exports  (enough to build 75,000 homes) that Canada’s forestry industry is planning to re-route from the U.S. to the U.K. and Europe.

100%: U.S. reliance on imports for 16 critical minerals (including graphite), with more than 50% import dependence for another 29, including zinc, cobalt, and nickel.

$600 billion: Canada’s non-U.S. export goal by 2035, as outlined in the 2025 federal budget–doubling the current amount.

$50 billion: The potential value of a trade partnership between Canada and India, which have renewed relations this year.

$100 billion: The annual value of Canada’s agri-food exports. Roughly 60% was destined for U.S. markets.

$994.63: The amount the average family in Canada can expect to pay more in groceries in 2026, compared to 2025. The toll of tariffs is impacting domestic food security, with one in four Canadians experiencing food insecurity.

86: Percentage of goods the U.S. imported from Canada in September that were duty free.

51: Number of days gold prices closed higher than previous all-time highs due to heightened geo-economic uncertainty.

28%: The increase in coffee prices year-over-year.

19%: Decline in Chinese exports to the U.S. this year.

US$244 billion: Total tariff revenues the U.S. has collected (January to November 2025)

1 million bpd: The potential capacity of a West Coast oil export pipeline at the heart of an MoU between the federal government and Alberta that would expand Alberta’s oil exports to Asia.

US$7 billion: The massive hit Michigan’s Big Three automakers—General Motors, Ford and Stellantis—expect on their earnings in 2025 from U.S. tariffs.

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Why Trump’s ‘very severe’ fertilizer tariff threat is a big deal

By Lisa Ashton, Director of Agriculture Policy, RBC Thought Leadership

U.S. President Donald Trump’s US$12 billion aid package for American farmers struggling with rising input costs like fertilizer and seeds comes with a sting for Canada. Trump is considering “very severe” tariffs on Canadian fertilizer to “bolster” U.S. domestic fertilizer production. 

This could prove to be an own goal for Washington. More tariffs on Canadian fertilizers are likely to raise prices for U.S. farmers in the short-term and could create volatility in securing long-term supply. The proposed move comes as the U.S. has few alternatives to Canadian fertilizer, while American farmers have limited leverage in the market and are price receivers. Here’s what is at stake for both the Canadian and U.S. agriculture sectors:

  • Canada accounts for 81% of U.S. potassium-based chemical fertilizer imports and tariffs would further raise costs along North America’s interconnected agri-food supply chain.1

  • The U.S. tried a version of this before: It imposed broad tariffs (25%) earlier this year on many Canadian imports, including potash and other fertilizers. After pushback from American farmers and industry groups, fertilizer tariffs were reduced to 10%.

  • Those moves proved to be a body blow as U.S. Import Price Index for chemical fertilizers rose from 164.5 in December 2024 to 186.5 in September 2025.2

    • The U.S. Prices Paid Index tracking costs paid by U.S. farmers rose to 149.9 in June 2025, up from 139.9 the year before. Over the same period, fertilizer costs were the primary driver for rising costs for U.S. crop farmers, up 11% in the index.3

  • Canada has the world’s largest potash reserves, with 1.1 billion tonnes of potash, which is 5x larger than U.S. reserves.4 Canada’s scale of potash mining by production volumes was 36x larger than the U.S. in 2024.5

  • Fertilizers account for roughly 30% to 45% of a U.S. farmer’s annual operating cost, depending on the crop.6 As farmers are vulnerable to volatility in input prices, they often can’t pass rising input costs onto consumers since many sell into commodity markets (i.e. corn, wheat, soybeans). That could challenge the U.S. administration’s efforts to reduce costs for farmers ahead of 2026 mid-terms with active tariffs on their inputs and threats of more.

The week that was

  • The U.S. could carve out separate deals with Canada and Mexico says U.S. Trade Representative Jamieson Greer. He said the Trump administration is leaving all options on the table when it comes to the Canada-U.S.-Mexico Agreement (CUSMA). Mark Carney was quick to dismiss the possibility of separate deals: “That’s not what they’re saying.”

  • Kirsten Hillman, Canada’s ambassador to the U.S. who played a key role in the CUSMA negotiations, announced that she will step down in the New Year. Hillman’s replacement has yet to be announced but reports surfaced that Mark Wiseman, former chief executive of the Canada Pension Plan Investment Board, is the front-runner.

  • Canada’s $153-million trade surplus in September blew past analysts’ expectations of a $4.5-billion deficit. Exports to the U.S. rose 4.6% (imports fell 1.7%). And exports to other parts of the world shot up 18.6%.

  • In the U.S. exports surged in September, resulting in the smallest trade deficit in 5 years.

  • And China’s trade surplus tops US$1 trillion for the first time. Despite trade tensions with the U.S., Beijing exported US$3.4 trillion worth of goods in the first 11 months of the year by finding, in part, new markets for its outbound shipments, including Africa (+26%), Southeast Asia (+14%) and Latin America (+7.1%).

Trump’s tariff toll

By Jordan Brennan, Managing Director, RBC Thought Leadership

President Trump has been making the point that tariffs carry with it short-term pain for long-term gain. The data confirms that he’s got the pain part right.

Inflation: Since Trump’s so-called ‘Liberation Day’ in April, producer prices in the U.S. have moved meaningfully higher. The knock-on-effect: consumer inflation has grown for five consecutive months and now stands at 3%—a level not seen since early 2024.

Producer and Consumer prices march higher since liberation day

Consumer sentiment: According to the University of Michigan’s long-running survey of consumers, confidence is sitting at half-century lows. Four of the 10 worst monthly readings have come since Liberation Day.

Manufacturing: Far from rebounding, manufacturing employment—including politically-sensitive auto jobs—has worsened since January. The U.S. has shed nearly 50,000 manufacturing jobs this year.

U.S. Manufacturing Employment Deteriorates in 2025

The rejoinder from the White House is inevitably that the tariff policy takes time and discomfort is transitional. But voters rarely reward distant promises over immediate pain. And Trump has already started to ease off, recently slashing tariffs on beef, coffee and assortment of other grocery-store items. Expect more selective tariff relief—targeted by region and by product—as the midterms draw closer.

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Also in this week’s edition: How five tariff-exposed industries in Canada are faring

Alberta’s MoU adds to Washington’s heavy-oil dilemma

By Shaz Merwat, Energy Policy Lead

As U.S. President Donald Trump hosted Prime Minister Mark Carney and Mexico’s President Claudia Sheinbaum, energy issues loomed in the background amid U.S. concerns about structural deficits in heavy crude. Historically, Canadian barrels competed with Venezuelan heavy crude in key U.S. refining markets—primarily the U.S. Midwest and the Gulf Coast. While Venezuelan volumes have been largely absent for the past decade, shifting U.S. foreign-policy signals suggest that competition could re-emerge.

Why it matters — Trump cannot unwind two core U.S. dependencies

Despite efforts to reshape U.S. supply chains, Washington remains structurally dependent on two things it cannot easily substitute: Canadian heavy crude and Chinese rare earths. Heavy crude is foundational to U.S. refining capacity, and as it stands, the U.S. cannot easily replace Canadian supply: domestic production is overwhelmingly light, and heavy-crude alternatives from Mexico and Venezuela have structurally declined.

These twin constraints limit U.S. leverage and elevate the importance of stable, long-term supply partners. Alberta’s Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) arrives at a moment when U.S. policymakers must balance geopolitical objectives—such as renewed attention on Venezuela—with the reality that Canadian barrels remain irreplaceable in the refinery system.

By the numbers — the heavy-barrel shortfall

  • Mexico: U.S. bound heavy-crude exports have fallen from as high as ~1.7 mb/d in 2005-2006 to roughly ~0.40 mb/d today.

  • Venezuela: heavy-crude exports to the U.S. surpassed 1.5 mb/d in the early 2000s; today U.S. exports are ~0.1 mb/d.

  • Canada: The dominant exporter to the U.S., with around four million barrels of crude shipped south of the border daily. The Canada-Alberta MoU proposed 1 million bpd pipeline, plus 300,000–400,000 bpd from Trans Mountain together create a sizeable uplift in export capacity—primarily oriented toward Asia.

The bigger picture — if Venezuela returns, does Canada lose leverage?

A Venezuelan “return” would likely be slow, expensive and politically fragile. Refinery contracts, debt obligations and upstream infrastructure all require rebuilding. Even under a regime change, investors will demand decade-long stability before committing capital.

Mexico faces similar limits: Sheinbaum inherits state-owned Pemex’s declining production and mounting debt, meaning a rapid restoration of heavy-crude exports is unlikely.

This leaves Canada as the only credible, scalable source of heavy supply. The MoU’s accelerated timelines—carbon-pricing equivalency, methane rules and Pathways carbon capture, utilization and storage project—signal Ottawa and Edmonton are preparing for sustained output growth.

Bottom line — the MoU prepares Canada for a more competitive heavy-oil landscape

As Canada builds westward capacity through TMX and the proposed 1 million bpd pipeline, more barrels are positioned for Asia rather than the U.S. That shift inevitably forces U.S. policymakers to consider how they will secure heavy-crude supply in the coming decade—including whether to re-engage Venezuela in a more meaningful way.

For Canada, today, this is less of a challenge. The MoU ensures that, regardless of how U.S. policy evolves, producers have diversified market access and greater resilience. If Venezuelan volumes rise, Canada will have optionality; if they do not, Canada remains the primary supplier to U.S. refiners.

Either way, the middle of the next decade is shaping up to be a far more dynamic heavy-oil environment—and the MoU positions Canada to navigate it from a position of strength.

The week that was

  • Canada entered the trade war in better shape than previously thought. StatsCan revised GDP for each of the past three years up by about half a point.

  • The Canadian government served automaker Stellantis a notice of default for shifting production of the Jeep Compass from Brampton, Ont., to Illinois despite receiving hundreds of millions in incentives in recent years. “Stellantis is on the hook,” said Industry Minister Mélanie Joly. “Defending these jobs means defending Canada’s economic backbone.”

  • While speaking to business leaders in Ottawa, Japan’s Ambassador to Canada Kanji Yamanouchi noted the role energy could play in future Canada-Japan relations. “If we need energy from a county which is difficult to trust or the country which we can trust,” he said, “it’s much better for us to have trade with a country with trust.”

  • Despite $500 million in government loans, Algoma Steel is laying off 1,050 workers from its plant in Sault Ste. Marie, Ont., in the face of “extraordinary and external market forces.”

Look what’s trending

The RBC Economics team did a deep dive this week: ‘Tracking the impact of U.S. tariffs on five targeted Canadian industries.’

Overall, we track moderately lower manufacturing production and employment in most of the highly tariffed sectors in Canada. These trends have also been much less volatile than international trade flow, that were heavily distorted around when tariffs were implemented (as U.S. importers front-ran purchases to build pre-tariff inventories in Q1.)

Selling prices among Canadian manufacturers have generally held up, with foreign buyers paying the bulk of initial tariff costs, but have led to declining U.S. corporate profits this year. We haven’t seen systemically higher U.S. consumer prices but still expect those will show up more significantly in 2026.

Here’s a breakdown of how five key Canadian industries have fared in their production, employment and selling prices, amid rising U.S. tariffs.

Read the full report here.

Listen Up – Disruptors: The Canada Project

In a recent episode of Disruptors, John Stackhouse takes listeners to Quebec to meet former premier Jean Charest and Eric Desaulniers, founder & CEO of Nouveau Monde Graphite. Together, they explore how a new graphite mine at Matawinie and an integrated refining plant at Bécancour aim to connect the full chain from rock to anode material in one province—and what that could mean for Canada’s role as a trusted supplier of critical minerals to its G7 allies.

From China’s dominance in graphite refining to Quebec’s push for all‑electric mining fleets powered by hydro, this episode looks at how Canada can move from “quarry” to strategic partner in a re‑wired global economy.

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The Canada-Alberta Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) sets the stage for the province to become a continental energy superpower across both traditional and non-traditional energy forms. A key piece of the MoU centres around a bitumen pipeline project provided Alberta proceeds with several low-carbon projects and programs in parallel.

As it stands, the province’s major projects inventory consists of almost 1,000 projects valued at $167 billion. Incorporating a new major bitumen pipeline, plus meaningful growth in data centres and accompanying power generation and distribution, could raise that figure to more than $400 billion.

Here are five themes that stood out to us from the MoU:

1. A clear roadmap: The level of specificity within the document gives the MoU teeth. Unlike most MoUs that usually focus on outlining broad contours of areas of co-operation, this MoU sets out clear guidelines and targets.

2. Tight deadlines: The accelerated timelines suggest an urgency that puts the onus on Alberta to deliver, quickly, on several climate policies in order to secure expansion of its fossil fuel sector. Most of the key action items required on the Alberta side (carbon pricing equivalency, methane equivalency, tri-lateral Pathways MoU) have an April 1, 2026, deadline. It also brings an urgency in British Columbia where Premier David Eby would have to make some quick decisions on a new pipeline (and the proposed expansion of Trans Mountain pipeline) across his province.

3. A new bitumen pipeline: The success of the MoU, especially in the context of a new, large bitumen pipeline, revolves around the historically challenged duty to consult and the Build Canada Act to bypass future legal challenges, which at this point appear almost certain.

4. A 700,000-bpd proposition: The Alberta government is expected to remain the central pipeline proponent until all parties—including Indigenous groups— are on board to reduce the possibility of delays and cost overruns that has plagued past pipeline expansions. In the nearer to mid-term (next five years), pipeline expansions across Enbridge’s Mainline and the federal government-owned Trans Mountain will add up to 600,000 to 700,000 barrels per day in added capacity, which should be enough to support growth for the remainder of this decade.

5. Low-carbon boost: The space given to non-oil and gas commentary such as a substantial expansion of power generation for traditional heavy industry, but also around data centres, interties, and domestic supply chain capture (e.g., Canadian steel and pipeline), suggests that the federal government is creating linkages to ensure a potential Alberta boom cascades across industries and provinces.

What’s being overlooked:

  • The increase in Alberta’s TIER price to $130 per tonne does not specify a date. The Canadian federal benchmark was set to cross that threshold in 2027/2028. Current Alberta TIER prices have since risen to $25-27/tonne (from $17-18/tonne just a couple weeks ago) according to RBC’s Environmental Markets trading desk, implying a 5x return if prices reach the threshold level;

  • The MoU makes specific reference to include enhanced oil recovery (EOR) as part of an extension of existing federal investment tax credits for carbon sequestration, utilization and storage (CCUS). The economic uplift from the ability to monetize the additional oil stream can be meaningful. According to a University of Calgary study, certain Alberta EOR-CCUS reservoirs are economically viable at a carbon price of $60/tonne. In comparison, a Colorado School of Mines study suggests that in the U.S. allowing EOR within the 45Q tax credit— designed to accelerate carbon capture, utilization and storage—could provide an additional economic benefit of between US$95-$120 per tonne of CO2e.

  • Both the construction of a bitumen pipeline and construction of the oilsands-led Pathways carbon capture, utilization and storage (CCUS) project are preconditions of one another. Yet, that precondition is dependent upon the commencement of ”Pathways Phase 1 Projects” (22-million tonnes out of Pathways’ total 50-million tonne capacity). It’s unclear if that references the sequestering (12 million tonnes) or emissions reductions (10 million tonnes) initiatives.

    Shaz Merwat is Energy Policy Lead at RBC Thought Leadership

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Happy birthday, CUSMA. Is seven your lucky number?

By John Stackhouse

The much-pilloried Canada-U.S.-Mexico trade agreement was signed seven years ago this weekend—on November 30, 2018. A year later, it was amended to address rules of origin for autos, digital trade, IP, dairy and, who could forget, a sunset clause. 

We can all do the math. The December 10, 2019 amendments set in motion a 16-year term for the agreement, with a mandatory review every six years. Which means we’ll see more of a requiem than a birthday bash next week when Mark Carney is in Washington to help kick off the 2026 FIFA World Cup. 

But don’t bury CUSMA just yet.

Despite the U.S. President’s freeze on negotiations, officials from both countries are talking every day and laying the groundwork for what will be an intense 2026. Not many insiders seriously expect CUSMA to go away; they’re working on changes—modifications, enhancements, renovations, depending on your point of view—that will continue to change the fabric of continental commerce.

Here’s what’s worth noting about CUSMA and its first five years (as it didn’t come into effect until 2020):

  • Canada-U.S. trade in goods is up about 23%;

  • Canada remains the U.S.’s top customer, buying US$440 billion of goods and services in 2024, or 14% of America’s exports;

  • U.S. direct investment in Canada hit $684 billion last year, up from about $400 billion; 

  • Canadian direct investment in the U.S. has doubled to $1.3 trillion;

  • between 2020-2024, automakers announced nearly US$175 billion in new investment in North American production, as they reshored supply chains to meet those rules of origin.

  • Canada-U.S. energy and agri-food trade has also surged in the 2020s, thanks in part to the certainty delivered by CUSMA. Energy is our biggest export to the U.S. — by far — worth $170 billion in 2024, up 50% from 2018.  

That energy number may be the biggest message Carney takes to Washington. Not by coincidence, he locked arms this week with Alberta Premier Danielle Smith to state boldly to Canadians, and the world, that the country will be exporting a lot more oil to Asia. The U.S. government, and many U.S. shippers, would prefer that crude flow south. But now Carney, with Smith’s help, can exert more leverage in his Washington trade talks.

Canada always tried to keep energy (and water) off the main trade table, which is focussed more on manufacturing. But in this new age of energy security, it may be what Canada needs more than ever to bend the ball like Beckham.

The week that was

  • Canada will slap 25% tariffs on about $10 billion worth of steel imports starting December 26, to support a domestic industry that has been battered by U.S. tariffs and cheap Chinese steel.

  • Canada Inc. is shrugging off tariffs. Operating profits of Canadian corporations rose 3.8% (the fastest pace of growth in two years) to $200 billion in the third quarter, according to Statistics Canada.

  • The U.S. will export a record 10.7 million tonnes (+40% YoY) of liquefied natural gas (LNG) in November, which is expected to drive down the price of gas in Asia and Europe over the winter.

  • Though relations remain chilly, Mark Carney confirmed that he spoke to Donald Trump this week—but he wouldn’t say if they talked trade. “I don’t want to over signal things…they haven’t re-engaged yet,” said Canada’s PM, who will be in Washington next week for a World Cup event alongside the U.S. President.

  • India is looking to both ramp up trade with Mexico and be spared the tariffs that President Claudia Sheinbaum plans to levy on a number of Asian countries.

Look what’s trending…

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In this week’s edition: The opportunities for Canada in Latin America and how Canadian exports of pulses provide valuable lessons when it comes to trade diversification

How to unlock Latin America

By John Stackhouse

Canada’s trade diversification menu seems to consist of East Asia and Western Europe, with a side dish of Middle Eastern and South Asian economies.

What happened to Latin America?

Sure, the prime minister and his senior team are all over Mexico — largely though as part of their North American trade strategy. The much bigger economic hemisphere south of the Rio Grande still beckons.

This week, the Canadian Council for the Americas published a significant policy paper on how Canada can position itself for the decade ahead in South America, Central America and the Caribbean. 

The region’s GDP is roughly $6 trillion, more than double Canada’s and more than double what it was 20 years ago. And yet Canadian exports in 2024 were a modest $18.6 billion, down nearly 11% that year as agri-food shipments got hammered by trade disruptions. 

Looking ahead, there are dozens of markets to consider, but just focussing on the Big Five—Brazil, Mexico, Chile, Colombia, Peru—would access a combined population of nearly 500 million people, half of them middle class.

We’ve spent the past 25 years negotiating and announcing Free Trade Agreements in Latin America. Most did much less than was promised. One illustration: we have $24 billion of investment in Chile, and less than $1 billion in exports. Now we need to be more strategic.

The CCA report suggests:

  • develop consortium approaches to infrastructure, to help fill the region’s $150 billion infrastructure gap

  • focus on energy (LNG), machinery, pipelines, digital systems, and mining technology

  • target machinery and equipment (buses, tunnelling equipment) for megaprojects

  • develop critical minerals partnerships, including processing

  • get more sophisticated with labour mobility, as we’ll need a lot more students, skilled workers, professionals and entrepreneurs from the region

  • step up as a security partner, helping with defence and security tech, including in space

An age of America First doesn’t need to mean Americas Last.

Check out the full report here.

The week that was

  • Mark Carney wrapped up his visit to Abu Dhabi by announcing a $70-billion investment from the United Arab Emirates–the money is expected to go towards the development of critical minerals, energy, ports and AI.

  • U.S. Ambassador to Canada linked purchase of F-35s to trade talks. Pete Hoekstra said that Canada needs to “harmonize” with the U.S. on some key economic and military issues to get back to the negotiating table. He specifically referenced the federal government’s F-35 fighter jet review.

  • The U.S. exported more to Mexico than Canada for the first time in 30 years. New trade data showed that US$226.4 billion of American goods went to Mexico between January and August this year, compared to the US$225.6 billion worth that crossed into Canada. While the ongoing trade tensions between Canada and the U.S. is one factor, the gap has been narrowing for years.

  • The Canadian Mutual Recognition Agreement, which eliminates all barriers to trading goods (except food) between provinces and territories, was signed this week and takes effect in December. The government estimates that it could drive $200 billion worth of value.

  • The European Union is looking to Australia and considering a similar strategy to the one the U.S. has taken when it comes to critical minerals and rare earths: invest directly in the mining companies.

Look what’s trending…

Services now make up nearly a quarter of Canada’s exports and have delivered 62% of total real exports growth since 2014. Services trade hold a key to diversification—they are less exposed to tariffs, more resilient to economic downturns, and are already more diversified with exports almost 50/50 split between U.S. and non-U.S. markets, compared to goods exports, 75% of which flow south of the border. (Read RBC Economics full report here).

Pulse(s) Check

By Lisa Ashton, Director of Agricultural Policy

Pulses, of which Canada is the number one exporter globally, is a powerful example of how Canada can deliver on its ambitions to diversify its trading partners beyond the U.S. It’s all about building the right trading relationships and investing in logistics and food-standard alignment where markets are growing.

Why it matters:

  • The 2025 federal budget outlines a plan to grow Canada’s trade with the world, including a goal to double Canada’s non-U.S. goods exports to $600 billion by 2035.

  • Specific to agri-food, the Canadian Food Inspection Agency (CFIA) is receiving funding to modernize it trade tools and work with trading partners to expand market access for Canadian agri-food products.

  • Diversification is easier said than done. The U.S. accounted for over 60% of Canada agri-food export value in 2024, making Canada the least diverse when it comes to trading partners among top agri-food exporters.

  • But Canada’s agri-food sector is staking its claim as a global leader in pulses. These pulses are destined for markets far beyond the U.S.

By the numbers:

  • Canadian pulses account for roughly 24% of global trade. For dried lentil and peas, Canada’s top markets include countries in South Asia and West Asia including India, Turkey, and the UAE as well as South America, including Columbia and Peru. Canada’s dried peas and lentils, examples of Canada’s pulses boom, export value in 2024 was nearly $4 billion.

  • The EU and Indo-Pacific are expected to increase annual consumption by 11% and 14%, respectively, over the next decade, providing growing market opportunities in Canada’s target markets identified in Budget 2025. 

  • To meet global demand, Canada’s pea and lentil production volumes have increased by roughly 73% and 393%, respectively, over the past 25 years. Pulses are an important crop in a farmers’ rotation, fixing nitrogen in soils, reducing the need for fertilizer application.

The bigger picture:

  • Global pulse consumption is expected to rise by 15% over the next decade.

  • Global production is led by Asia and Africa with annual growth in product at roughly 3%. India is the single largest producer accounting for 29% of global production with most of their production being used for domestic consumption. 

  • China is the largest importer of pulses, accounting for about 13% of global trade.

  • The U.S., Turkey and Ukraine follow Canada in exports of dried peas. But Canada, maintains a strong lead, exporting volumes that are 5 times that of the U.S.

Bottomline:

Canada’s approach to diversifying goods exports to non-U.S. markets can learn from the Canadian pulse experience of expanded domestic production, efficiently navigating international trade logistics, and diversification in growth markets where demand is expected to continue to rise. 

References: OECD-FAO: OECD-FAO Agricultural Outlook, 2025; OECD. OECD Agriculture statistics (database), 2025; UN COMTRADE. Trade Data, 2025.

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In this week’s edition: North America’s Critical Minerals Moment — and Canada’s Strategic Role

What will define Canada’s new relationship with Saudi Arabia

By John Stackhouse

A few years ago, Saudi Arabia and Canada were barely on speaking terms. Now they’re exploring trade deals, investment opportunities and, if plans come together, a visit to the Kingdom next year by Mark Carney.

In the Age of Trump, they’re among a host of mid-sized powers that are looking to carve out a new economic and geopolitical path.

Here’s what could redefine the Saudi-Canadian relationship: energy, including renewables, nuclear and EVs; advanced manufacturing, including drones and satellites; AI and quantum; mining and critical minerals; and advanced education and health care. The two countries also have a lot of capital to deploy, and a lot of capital that they need.

The rapidly evolving relationship was on display earlier this month when Saudi Investment Minister Khalid Al-Falih spent a day in Ottawa, with Carney and a range of senior ministers, and then a day on Bay Street. Less noticed but also important was Alberta Premier. Danielle Smith’s visit to the region, including Saudi Arabia, to promote energy technology and investment.

Here’s some of what may be worth watching in the coming months:

  • Carney’s pitch for $1 trillion+ in new investment (most of it private capital) will need to include sources like Saudi investment funds and corporates;

  • Saudi’s ambitions to diversify its energy sector—Al-Falih mentioned green and blue hydrogen, green ammonia and EVs—could use a lot more Canadian technology, talent and investment. The visiting Saudis met with Ontario autoparts makers, hoping they might want to be part of the Saudi ambition to make 600,000 EVs a year;

  • Canadian manufacturers and producers, especially in agri-food, can be leading players in Saudi’s ambition to be a food hub for the Middle East and North Africa.

The week that was

  • Ottawa is hoping to restart trade talks with India under a “new process,” said Canadian Trade Minister Maninder Sidhu. On a three-day visit to India, the Minister discussed critical minerals, clean energy, agriculture and artificial intelligence.

  • In an effort to lower grocery bills, U.S. President Donald Trump is working lower tariffs on items like coffee and bananas into deals with a handful of Latin American countries. 

  • The price of pasta from Italy, however, could skyrocket for Americans come January when the proposed 107% tariff on goods from 13 Italian companies is scheduled to begin.

  • Canada’s forestry industry is planning to re-route about 10% of wood (enough to build 75,000 homes) that would normally go to the U.S. to the UK and Europe.

  • Amazon and Microsoft threw their support behind the Gain AI Act, legislation that would require chip makers to satisfy U.S. demand before exporting to other countries, including China. Nvidia, which has been seeking access to the world’s second largest economy, view the act as an unnecessary intervention.

North America’s critical minerals moment — and Canada’s strategic role

By Shaz Merwat, Director of Energy Policy

A recent submission to U.S. Trade Representative Jamieson Greer from the Coalition for North American Trade (CNAT)—co-chaired by former U.S. House Ways and Means Chairman Kevin Brady, Canada’s former NAFTA lead negotiator Steve Verheul, and Mexico’s Ken Ramos—positions CUSMA as one of the continent’s most powerful tools for rebuilding critical-minerals security.

Key details from the filing:

  • The U.S. remains 100 percent import-reliant for 16 critical minerals (including graphite) and over 50 percent reliant for another 29 such as rare earths, zinc, cobalt, and nickel.

  • Canada is the U.S.’s primary import source for indium, nickel, potash, tellurium, uranium, vanadium, and zinc—and the second largest for copper, graphite, niobium, and tungsten.

The CNAT submission argues the CUSMA’s tariff-free architecture and co-production model are the ideal platform to accelerate re- and near-shoring of critical-minerals supply chains—from exploration and permitting to processing, refining, and battery-grade materials. Integrating Canada’s resource base with U.S. manufacturing strength and Mexico’s processing capacity fills a gap in critical-minerals collaboration to date, with most of the focus on G7+ allies.

For Canada, the strategic opening lies in deepening trilateral integration—leveraging CUSMA to attract investment, expand value-added processing, and align upstream resources with the broader North American production system to build a fully regional critical-minerals platform.

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Will Washington flinch if Canada sells more oil to Asia?

By Shaz Merwat, Director, Energy Policy

Ottawa’s trade diversification push, laid out in part in the Federal Budget this week, could redraw North America’s energy map—and test its most important economic relationship.

Why it matters

  • The 2025 federal budget sets an explicit goal: double Canada’s non-U.S. goods exports to about $600 billion by 2035.

  • Mark Carney’s ASEAN tour last week reinforced that ambition, courting Asian partners and positioning Canada’s growth story squarely in the East.

  • Together, these moves turn oil and growing LNG exports into instruments of economic diversification and strengthening multilateralism within trade.

  • A removal of the oil and gas emissions cap opens the door to greater oil exports to Asia.

By the numbers

  • Roughly 75% of Canada’s exports flow to the United States.

  • In 2024, Canadian energy exports totaled $197 billion, with crude oil alone accounting for $147 billion.

  • About 91% of Canada’s crude exports remained U.S.-bound through the first seven months of 2025. Canada’s remaining crude exports–about 450,000 barrels a day, about 1% of Asian demand–ends up in Asia.

  • Asia’s oil-import demand i.e., India, China, Japan, and South Korea has climbed by more than 25% since 2015 to about 22 mb/d, driven primarily by China and India’s rapid industrial growth.

The bigger picture

  • Heavy crude’s staying power: Electrification is largely displacing gasoline – a light barrel – but not diesel, jet fuel or petrochemical feedstocks. That longevity gives heavy barrels strategic value.

  • Asia’s heavy-oil hub: China is sharply pivoting into petrochemicals, aiming to take Japanese and Korean market share. India, too, is expected to see oil imports grow 1.5 million bpd by 2035 as both countries seek steady supplies of heavy and sour crude. Today, that supply originates from the Middle East, Russia and Venezuela, creating an opening for a stable, Western entrant.

  • Investment and offtake matter: Canada’s oil expansion will come from oil sands growth. Long-term commitments–both investment and offtake – will be essential to anchor any future West Coast capacity. With CNOOC, Sinopec and PetroChina already in Canada, and better ties with India envisioned, how would renewed Asian capital be welcomed in Ottawa…and Washington?

  • Carbon and shipping constraints: Industrial carbon pricing, expectations for progress on progression on the Pathways carbon capture and storage project, a federal Tanker Ban and tighter International Maritime Organization (IMO) shipping regulations all hang in the balance, unanswered.

Bottom line

Canada’s bid to expand exports through a multilateral trade system could sit awkwardly beside Washington’s more bilateral instincts. For decades, U.S. policy has treated Canadian energy as a secure extension of its own supply chain. As Ottawa builds eastward links and asserts greater agency in global oil markets, it’s not only testing the flexibility of the North American partnership—it’s testing whether America will allow that independence to take shape.

The week that was

  • The Liberal government’s federal budget earmarked billions of dollars in funding in response to the Trump Administration’s tariffs.

    • As part of the shift from “reliance to resilience,” the budget pledged $5 billion over seven years to create the Trade Diversification Corridors Fund.

    • And an additional billion dollars for an Arctic Infrastructure Fund with a stated goal, in part, of linking the Canada’s North to global markets.

    • The introduction of a $2 billion critical minerals sovereign fund, that would make equity investments, loan guarantees and offtake agreements with mining companies.

  • The Supreme Court case pertaining to President Trump’s use of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act to impose tariffs, including the fentanyl tariffs on Canada, kicked off. Even members on the bench from the conservative majority questioned the U.S. President unilaterally setting tariffs on imports. A decision is likely months away.

  • By approving measures to protect farmers, the European Union moved a step closer to the Mercosur trade deal, a massive agreement with South American nations that’s been a quarter century in the making.

  • Despite pressure from U.S. tariffs, Ontario projected a smaller deficit than expected in its fiscal update. The economic statement also promised a balancing of the books in 2027-28.

  • The U.S. Department of the Interior added silver and copper to its list of critical minerals paving the way for both to be included in future tariff policies.

Final word(s)

“The U.S. footprint in global trade will be smaller. The world needs to adjust to that. It will be a bigger adjustment for us.”
–Bank of Canada Governor Tiff Macklem, speaking at The Logic’s Summit this week.

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In this week’s edition: Lots of trade talk on the sidelines of the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation summit and a generational investment in Canada’s competitiveness

Significant shifts ahead

By John Stackhouse

This week’s federal budget will aim to reorient Canada’s economy for a new global economic order, and that goes well beyond Donald Trump. 

The Canadian economy has been out of step with global trading and investment patterns for some time. Trump just shone a light on it. 

Consider trade itself. Global trade as a percentage of GDP reached a post-war peak of about 60%, coinciding with the Global Financial Crisis (itself an outcome of trade and investment imbalances). It’s since dropped to the mid-50s, and will likely come down a touch this year and next as the global economy slows. 

This doesn’t mean an end to globalization. It does indicate a re-globalization that—cue the budget signals—will lead to significant capital shifts. And they will be perhaps more significant than anything we’ve seen in 25 years, since China entered the WTO and became the new magnetic pole for global capital. 

This time, capital won’t flow to the lowest cost, mass producer. It will find the sources of strategic goods and resources, which would play well to the new Canadian pitch. Especially for energy, minerals, defence, space and food. 

Those strategic exports will be especially valuable to some of Canada’s key trading partners like South Korea and Germany, as they seek to reduce reliance on the U.S. and China. Moreover, big exporters like the Koreans and Germans will need more secure energy supplies if they’re going to be ready for a world of more modest trade in manufactured goods. 

I spoke about this new energy security paradigm last week at an IEA energy innovation forum, on the sidelines of the G7 energy ministers meeting in Toronto. You can read the full text here.

The week that was

  • Prime Minister Mark Carney’s meeting with China’s President Xi Jinping this past Friday didn’t yield any major results but it was the first formal meeting between a Canadian Prime Minister and the Chinese President since 2017. Carney, who described it as a “turning point” for the two countries, also accepted XI’s invitation to visit China.   

  • Wanting more info on the state of Canada-U.S. relations, several Canadian Premiers are calling on Carney to host a First Ministers’ meeting. The last time the PM met with the premiers was August 6. 

  • A couple of days after U.S. President Donald Trump vowed he wouldn’t talk with Carney for some time, the two were placed directly across from one another during an eight-person dinner hosted by South Korea’s President. The PMO wouldn’t confirm if trade talk was on the menu but did say the World Series was a topic of conversation.

  • On Friday, Trump doubled down on his promise to not engage Canada in trade talks; which differed from the message sent from his Energy Secretary Chris Wright, who, while at the G7 Energy and Environment Ministers’ meeting, said the goal is for the two countries to get back to the table and cooperate more closely on oil, gas and critical minerals.

  • While it didn’t lead to a finalized trade deal, the meeting between Donald Trump and China’s Xi Jinping resulted in agreements on a few key items–including export controls on rare earths and chips.

  • The truce came on same day China’s factory activity numbers revealed its longest decline in nine years.

Port to Prosperity

Canada’s prosperity depends heavily on how efficiently it can move goods to market—yet its largest ports have fallen behind the world’s best.

In the latest episode of Disruptors: The Canada Project, John Stackhouse spoke with Devan Fitch, Program Manager of the Roberts Bank Terminal 2. The long-planned project, at the mouth of Fraser River Delta, represents a generational investment in Canada’s competitiveness.

Here’s an excerpt from this week’s episode:

JS: Most Canadians probably take the Port of Vancouver for granted, even though if you look around, at least some of the stuff in your life passed through this port. Give us a sense, Devin, of the magnitude of the Port of Vancouver and what it means to the Canadian economy.

DF: If you take out of the equation all of the trade that we do with the U.S. and you think about the trade that we do with the rest of the world, $1 in every $3 of trade passes through the Port of Vancouver. That’s supporting businesses right across Canada. Consumers right across Canada. We happen to be located in Vancouver, but we are very much Canada’s port.

JS: As I understand it, the Port of Vancouver is the size, nearly, of the next five biggest ports in the country.

DF: That’s correct.

JS: And Roberts Bank will enable it to grow by another 30%. Is that correct?

DF: Yeah, somewhere between 20 and 30%.

JS: What does 30% bigger actually mean?

DF: In one fell swoop, it will increase capacity on the west coast of Canada by approximately one third. It will add 135 hectares of new waterfront trade enabling industrial land in one of the most industrial land constrained regions of North America. To give you a sense of scale of T2 – 12-million cubic metres of sand and 4-million cubic meters of manufactured rock. On the sand side, that’s about 2,500 Olympic sized swimming pools.

JS: Sounds enormous, but how does it compare to the world’s mega ports?

DF: It’s big for Canada. It is modest in size and scale compared to some of the largest ports around the world in Asia and Europe. But certainly a step function increase for Canada. It will provide capacity to move a $100 billion worth of trade goods every single year and support over 17,000 supply chain jobs across the nation.

JS: Give us a sense of how the port business is transforming and what opportunities there may be for Canada to move up in the competition leagues.

DF: Right now the world’s biggest container ships are about 24,000 twenty-foot equivalent units (TEUs). They’re applying their trade from Asia to Europe, and we see shipping lines cascading those large ships onto the North American routes as they age. We’re expecting as we move forward to see a significant increase in the size of ships, calling at the Port of Vancouver. Right now the average size is around 10,000 TEUs and we’re building Roberts Bank Terminal 2 to futureproof it to be able to accommodate ships as large as 24,000 TEUs.

Listen to the full episode here.

In this special season of Disruptors: The Canada Project, we’re crisscrossing the country and speaking to visionary leaders who are harnessing technology to take on Canada’s most-urgent challenges. Listen and subscribe wherever you get your podcasts.