The World Economic Forum this year became a tale of two Davoses.

Inside the main Congress Centre, a record number of attendees, including 850 CEOs, 80 tech billionaires and founders, hundreds of ministers and 65 heads of government spent the week hearing about the decline of globalization and the inward turn of societies.

Outside, it was a very different world. On the town’s main promenade, you couldn’t walk 50 metres without feeling like you were in a mash-up of Wall Street, Silicon Valley and the United Nations, as countries from Brazil to Indonesia and companies from Tech Mahindra to Pinterest pitched themselves to the passing kaleidoscope of a crowd.

Mark Carney called this new environment one of “variable geometry.” Others called it a new age of “multi-alignment”—as if the global economy is becoming a bit more of a bartering and babbling souk than a tightly wired marketplace. By any name, the emerging world order, or disorder, seems as slippery and risky as the icy streets of Davos. Here’s some of what to look out for:

Trump’s World: America First or America Alone?

Last year, a day after his second inauguration, Donald Trump spoke by video to the Forum and promised a golden age for America. This time, he came in person to proclaim victory. With five cabinet secretaries and hundreds of American CEOs in tow, the President spent an extraordinary two days in the Swiss Alps projecting a 21st century version of American power. This is no stay-at-home superpower. In Trump’s vision, the world will trade and prosper more than ever, on America’s terms.  Close to three-quarters of global trade is still compliant with WTO rules. Inventory build-ups helped many companies escape the initial tariffs. A greater impact may come this year. But for the most part, “it’s still holding,” said Christine Lagarde, head of the European Central Bank, arguing the global economy is so intricate and intertwined even the U.S. cannot unravel it. Trump’s more mercantile Pax America is not just economic. He came with an unsolicited bid for Greenland that was rejected by his closest NATO allies. He left with a Board of Peace, supported by an unlikely collection of 19 countries with a combined GDP of $5 trillion, roughly equal to Germany. Only four (Albania, Bulgaria, Hungary, Turkiye) are in NATO, and only four (Argentina, Indonesia, Saudi Arabia, Turkiye) are in the G20. Will Trump be able to expand America’s reach without stronger partners? Or is this the new geometry of power?

Carney’s World: Rupture or restoration?

Mark Carney, long viewed as the quintessential “Davos Man,” gave a keynote speech that was widely celebrated for capturing the distraught mood of many there and crystallizing the desire for a new approach to international affairs. His tag line—“nostalgia is not a strategy”—resonated. Now he has to deliver on diversification. There’s no easy path. Canada’s closest allies in Europe are each struggling, economically and politically, weakened by the Ukraine war, immigration crises and a growing appeal of nationalism, which is now the biggest political force on the continent. Europe’s biggest economy, Germany, narrowly escaped a recession last year, after two years of decline. Chancellor Friedrich Merz called Europe “world champions of over-regulation” and at risk of losing its unity if it doesn’t reform. Canada will need more distant partners, too, particularly China and India, which the WEF estimates will account for nearly 40% of global economic growth over the next five years. Both emerging giants can be as tough as Trump when it comes to trade. The Persian Gulf beckons, too, with trillions of dollars of capital investment. But there, too, a new generation of economic partners have different political and legal systems—and social customs—to the neighbourhood where Canada grew up.

“No King” comes for dollar

High above Davos, someone carved a message into a mountaintop glacier: “No King.” It was probably meant for the visiting U.S. President but equally could have been a message from European markets to the mighty greenback. King Dollar had a rough week, facing big questions as global trade winds shift, and countries and companies look to re-orient capital flows. The dollar still dominates 88% of global foreign exchange transactions, and 54% of global trade, which is why so many still cite TINA (There Is No Alternative). Or is there? The WEF opened to the startling news that Denmark’s largest pension funds had dumped U.S. treasuries in retaliation to the Greenland threat. A risk-off America vibe sent U.S. bond yields higher, reducing hopes for broader rate cuts. In moments like this, investors tended to stay in America, through real estate or stocks. This time, at least among Europeans, there was plenty of corridor chatter about a secular shift forming. One fund manager said his investors had asked him to sell down U.S. holdings. A few American tech executives said long-time European clients were cancelling orders. The euro, yen and Canadian dollar may play greater roles. The renminbi should gain prominence, although is years away from being a serious global alternative. Uneasy lies its head, but there’s still only one king wearing the currency crown.

Davos meets (and greets) state capitalism

The World Economic Forum was created in the 1970s to help Europe avoid the rise of socialism, and turn instead to free markets. A half century later, much of the West is again turning to the state to meet various economic ambitions—and the risks are evident. As countries, Canada included, seek to build back their militaries, build up their own technology foundations and become less reliant on the U.S.—home to roughly half the world’s financial capital—they are looking to leverage their own balance sheet and use other tools to direct capital to national priorities. These ambitions are so pronounced that many prime ministers and presidents seemed more like investment bankers working the Davos crowd. Advanced economies like Australia, Norway, Germany and South Korea do indeed have capacity to borrow more for investment, as do many emerging economic powers like Saudi Arabia. But capitalism is about more than capital; it’s about putting capital to work, with results. Singapore’s president, Tharman Shanmugaratnam, offered some sage advice, urging these new nation-state capitalists to be ruthless with investing, and with spending and regulation, too. Growth requires governments to focus on productive investments, including education, rather than redistribution—and a humble recognition that governments are inherently weak at building economic enterprises. If this new shot at state capitalism is to work, a new mindset will be needed, too.

China lies low, biding its time

Right after Donald Trump was first elected President, Xi Jinping came to Davos, to offer up China as a global leader for an emerging age. In the ensuing decade, Beijing has delivered—in renewable energy, nuclear power, critical minerals, pharmaceuticals and AI. So much so that Xi no longer needs to be there. This time, while the U.S. and Europe shouted at each other, he sent one of his less powerful vice premiers, He Lifeng, to position their country as a defender of multilateral trade and “inclusive globalization.” China experts said Beijing is not missing a moment to quietly advance its two biggest priorities—reunification with Taiwan and AI supremacy. Xi sees AI as critical to China’s future, and DeepSeek 4, the next-generation AI model expected in February, will show how far China’s come. On that other front, it’s believed the Chinese military, which conducted naval exercises around Taiwan at New Year’s, is ready to take the island by force, if necessary, within a year, which would give it sway over the world’s semiconductor industry that is so essential to AI. Democratic Senator Chris Coons, who was at Davos, fears the U.S. Administration doesn’t appreciate the need for “a network of allies with core values” to contain China. We’ll get a clearer picture when Trump and Xi meet in April, but don’t expect a grand bargain between the hegemons. Best case, Coons said, may be a series of “small landing points” to keep the world in balance.

Big Data: A new political target

Data centres seem to be eating the world, electron by electron. But will the capital be there again in 2026 to feed their financial appetite? Data centre spending surpassed $500 billion last year, and when combined with broader electricity needs, according to McKinsey, may total $6.7 trillion over the next five years. The world has never seen an infrastructure boom like this. Data centre construction is now the single biggest contributor to U.S. economic growth; tech spending as a share of all investment is now running 50% higher than it was during the broadband boom of 2000, and triple what the U.S. spent on Interstate highways in the 1960s. Vacancy rates for data centres recently hit a record low of 1.6%, as developers bid up available spaces. “We may need more,” said Larry Fink, CEO of Blackrock. “If we don’t scale, China wins.” Equinix, a large data centre player, faces ten times the demand for every new unit they build. Land is no longer the constraint; energy is, as a medium-sized centre requires the energy of a small town. Such operations last year accounted for two-thirds of U.S. load growth, making them a new political target in boom states like Virginia and Ohio where electricity prices have soared. They’re also a growing concern in Africa and South-east Asia, the world’s fastest-growing regions, where countries have found themselves outbid for gas turbines and other power equipment.

AC or AI: It’s gridlock

The next energy crisis won’t be fueled by oil or gas; it will be strained by the world’s faltering electricity grids. Electricity demand globally is rising three times faster than total energy demand, driven by air conditioning and electric vehicles, as well as data centres. While 90% of Americans have access to air conditioning, the number is 20% in India, 18% in Indonesia and 5% in Nigeria—each with some of the world’s fastest-growing cities. Add to that the growing demand for EVs, which now account for a quarter of global car sales, up from 5% in just five years. Fatih Birol, head of the International Energy Agency, said the world will need 10,000 terra-watts of new electricity in the next decade, which is the equivalent of adding another U.S., Canada, Europe and Japan. Without any innovation breakthroughs, that would require 70% more copper, and a vast expansion of steel and critical minerals processing. Developments in large-scale battery storage and grid digitalization offer some hope, as most electricity systems still suffer a gross mismatch of supply and demand. But an unfortunate truth remains: it’s easier and faster to build power plants than it is to add transmission and distribution. Take this recent experience in Europe: the continent added 80 gigawatts of renewable energy supply only to find it didn’t have the capacity to transmit all that new electricity.

A renewable lease on energy

There were two vastly telling moments in Davos’s main Congress Hall, one speaking to scarcity, the other to abundance. Donald Trump went off script to lambaste renewable energy, especially wind which he said was for “losers.” A day later, Elon Musk used the same stage to profess a glorious future for renewables, especially solar which he said could power all of America if he had his way. Just give him a parcel of land, 160 kilometres by 160 kilometres, and tariff-free solar panels! Away from North America, renewables are still the driver of energy growth and have shifted from a “transition” source to a default for new supply in many markets. Europe reached roughly 50% renewable generation in 2024. In other fast-growing markets, renewables are increasingly seen as energy additions, not just replacements for fossil fuels. Falling battery costs (solar is down roughly 80% in India) and longer lifetimes (30–35 years) have helped shift economics from a simple cost per unit to a cost per lifecycle. But reliability remains a challenge, which will require more battery storage, pumped hydro, and hybrid round-the-clock systems. But that’s happening in places like India, which has installed 2.7 million rooftop solar systems and 3.1 million solarized pumps and has already hit its 2030 target for renewables to account for roughly 50% of non-fossil fuel energy.

For companies, AI goes small

AI has shifted from an experimental technology to foundational infrastructure—and now an operating system for companies and governments. The competitive advantage is not just model innovation; it’s diffusion and how fast firms can beat their competitors to transform. As diffusion accelerates, Anthropic co-founder and CEO Dario Amodei sees 2026 as the year when AI systems build AI systems, including within firms, in ways that could upend entire business models. Demis Hassabis, co-founder and CEO of DeepMind, said the advantage will go to “continuous learners” who track what models are doing and adjust strategies and workflows. Seizing that approach, most CEOs have taken AI ownership out of the tech department and parked it on their desk. A BCG survey, released at Davos, found that 72% of global CEOs see AI as a core part of their mandate, with half believing it will define their tenure. Companies plan to double AI spending this year, even though a 2025 MIT study found very few adopters had seen a financial return. David Sacks, the Silicon Valley guru who is Donald Trump’s AI czar, sees the need for leaders, in government, business and media, to dispel fears, and embrace the chance to disrupt and innovate. He cited another study that found 83% of Chinese are optimistic about AI, compared to 39% of Americans. Sacks worries that “a fit of pessimism” will result in the U.S. losing the AI race due to what he described as a “self-inflicted injury.”

On jobs, AI becomes snakes and ladders

There’s a new financial math for AI. It’s what Microsoft CEO Satya Nadella calls “tokens per dollar per watt”—basically the energy cost per unit of compute. Think of it as a kind of basic wage and productivity measure for AI. And the companies, and countries, that can drive down that unit cost will be positioned to win in the data economy. This new math may fundamentally change the nature of human work, too. Think of it as “data x energy x labour = success.” The C-suite consensus at Davos seemed to be that labour, like data and energy, will be needed even more. CEOs said the entry-level “job cliff” is overstated; the real problem is a widening skills mismatch, as most roles will require a re-bundling of tasks and skills. The winners will be the workers (and firms) that can integrate and operate with AI. This transformation is resetting corporate ladders, especially in professional services and governments, where basic tasks like document review, screening and modelling can be done by machines. New apprenticeship designs will be the hot HR need, to build judgement, context, and supervision skills. More model design and modification will be pushed to the frontlines, where employees can create small pieces of automation to transform their work. All this can flatten organizations, and give advantage to those with abundant data, cheap energy and AI-savvy teams.

Zero Sum = Zero Trust

Growing divisions in the world, and within countries, is a matter of trust. And we’re losing it. Stefanie Stantcheva, a Harvard economist, finds it’s especially acute for her generation—those under 40—who see a zero-sum world and their slice shrinking. She shared research at Davos showing how distrust now spans the political spectrum, with a wide range of millennials feeling other groups have captured government agendas through mainstream media, corporate influence and old-school politics. That tension will grow as aging voters in the West demand more income and health security, perhaps at the cost of economic and national security. The Edelman Trust Barometer, which surveys 34,000 people in 28 countries and is released annually at Davos, found societies sliding from grievance into insularity; seven in 10 people are hesitant or unwilling to trust those with different values, backgrounds, or information sources. Trust is also shifting away from institutions to “people like me,” neighbours, co-workers, and one’s CEO. Business is now seen as both most competent and most ethical, surpassing NGOs on ethics for the first time, while government and media remain the least trusted. Most starkly, optimism is fading: in many countries, majorities no longer believe they or their families will be better off in five years, citing economic anxiety, AI, misinformation, and global conflicts.

On the eve of Canada hosting the G7 Energy and Environment Ministers’ meeting in Toronto, John Stackhouse, Senior Vice President, Office of the CEO, RBC, delivered a keynote at the IEA Energy Innovation Forum 2025. He focused on three forces redefining how the world operates.  

As you all know, we live in a new era of urgency, in which ambitions are growing and horizons shrinking.

• It took 15 years for the semiconductor to change the world

• It took 5 years for the Internet to change the world

• And it’s taken barely 15 months for Generative AI to change entire landscapes

I was reminded of these new forces of compression during a visit to Silicon Valley last week where a few major tech CEOs said the same thing: “Long term is now six months.”

Yes, we live in a time of unprecedented change and unprecedented compression. And we live in a world that’s being restructured, in our view, by three defining forces. These forces are converging to redefine how nations, markets and societies operate—and they are all connected by energy security.

The first mega force of the 2020s will not surprise any of you. It’s frontier technology. 

Roughly 45% of the S&P 500 today is comprised of AI Hyperscaler stocks. These hyperscalers are spending more than half a trillion dollars a year, collectively, and that’s rising. For 2025-2027, that could mean $1.5 trillion.

It’s a huge concentration of capital that towers over what now seems like a distant memory: the big capital swings that the U.S. Inflation Reduction Act unleashed just five years ago.

Energy is essential to that growth, as you don’t scale—let alone hyperscale—without a new quantum of energy. And it needs to be secure energy.

The second mega force are the growing geopolitical divisions over trade.

Global trade as a percentage of GDP grew steadily following the Second World War from 10% to reach roughly 60% at the onset of the Great Financial Crisis. It has since plateaued in the mid-50s. This likely falls further next year, with trade volumes expected to increase a meager 0.5% in 2026, much slower than global GDP growth of 2.6%.

We don’t see an end to globalization, but this new age of re-globalization will lead to further capital shifts and energy innovation, just as we saw a quarter century ago when China joined the WTO.

Why? Countries trading less will inherently need more of their own energy, or at least energy from a smaller range of suppliers. Bring on the innovation.

Third, we’ve entered a new security paradigm in which defence—including space—will make major claims on both public and private capital in this more fractured, uncertain and conflictual world. Increased defence and security needs are top of mind for most of our governments. And, as you all know, defence supremacy requires energy.

NATO countries are targeting spending on defence and security to be 5% of GDP by 2035. That’s an annual spend of $2 trillion–and this in rapidly aging societies that may have less productive capacity and greater social need.

This trio of global shifts—in technology, trade and security—will require capital and demand innovation. Critically, these forces point to a clear global need: low-cost, accessible, reliable energy.

You don’t have security in the 2020s without data, critical minerals and energy. Every major advancement in AI will rely on enormous computing power. By 2035, global data center power demand is expected to reach 1,600 TWh, that equals the current power needs of Germany, the UK and France.

Just this week, the U.S. government announced a massive partnership with Brookfield Asset Management, Cameco and Westinghouse Electric, to accelerate the deployment of nuclear power—in part because of America’s ambition of AI supremacy.

Nations and companies that secure abundant and ideally low-carbon power will own the digital future. I stress low-carbon power because renewables are still the cheapest form of electricity generation. Low-carbon power because nuclear is the most energy dense, and increasingly adaptable with the advent of SMRs. Low-carbon power because Big Tech remains committed to procuring affordable, reliable and clean over the medium to longer term. For the G7, low-carbon power can be a competitive advantage and key to a security agenda.

Nations that master the ability to generate, store and distribute these diverse power sources, locally, will also reduce security vulnerability. From drones, sensors and cyber defence–modern militaries are increasingly electrified and digitized. And in an economic environment that can feel more like a battlefield than a marketplace, energy self-sufficiency will reduce exposure to price shocks and geopolitical pressure. Nations that master next generation energy technologies—think large-scale battery storage, or carbon removal and storage—will govern the industries of the future.

This competition for those industries may be won by those that have secure, affordable access to data, energy, and critical minerals. And that competition will be shaped by the two great techno-powers, the U.S. and China. As I mentioned earlier, the new security imperative depends on three inputs—AI, energy and critical minerals. The U.S. has two of these three. China is well on its way to having three out of three. Through collaboration, the G7+ can have an overwhelming security of all three. But we need to be faster, faster and faster. Back to that Silicon Valley ethos of time.

For energy, faster means removing frictions in key inputs traded across our nations. And faster means removing our own internal frictions. Across the developed world, it simply takes too long to build major projects. We have not found a way to disrupt NIMBYISM.

If we do, removing these frictions can quicken development, reduce uncertainty, improve economics and unlock capital to move in both speed and scale. Faster, faster and faster.

This is what is needed to keep pace with the speed in which our energy systems are transforming. Systems that used to evolve over decades now need to reinvent themselves in just a few years.

Energy efficiency–the “first fuel”—has slowed in the past decade. Grid modernization, renewable integration and EV infrastructure must scale faster than any energy transformation in history. Supply chains for lithium, nickel and rare earths are being rebuilt in real time to reduce our dependence on China.

A collaborative approach to responsible resource development across the G7 could be streamlined, with common regulations, standards and financing to mobilize cross-border flows. But let’s not fool ourselves, retooling energy systems at breakneck speed is not cheap. Ten years ago, the economic conditions were, frankly, more accommodating.

• Low-cost capital

• More fiscal capacity for subsidies

• More aligned policy support and favourable market conditions

All those made clean energy projects financially attractive and relatively low risk. Today, higher long-term interest rates, trade frictions, and inflationary supply chain pressures have made the same investment environment more challenging.

And that presents a dilemma. Sustainable energy investments for all of the above could require $2 trillion per year—globally. And that is at the heart of our collective energy innovation challenge. Venture Capital and Private Equity are needed to drive innovation and new technologies to proof of concept. But we’ve reached a point where demonstration projects are too expensive for traditional venture capital and too risky for mainstream capital. This is challenge known as the ‘missing middle’ of capital.

Yet this challenge, is an opportunity. While China has become a global trading nation and clean tech leader, the G7 still dominates capital flows. G7 currencies account for 85% of global foreign exchange volume and dominate the $12.3 trillion in global currency reserves. And a lot of that capital—public and private—is flowing toward these opportunities around security.

Just think of how much has changed in the past six months—a.k.a. the new long term.

First, governments are now investors. We’ve seen the Pentagon create what’s essentially a private equity arm–a firm signal that governments will take more active roles as procurers, capital allocators and resource captors to ensure their economic prosperity and energy and resource security.  The Canadian government is standing up a new Defence Investment Agency with similar ambitions and will likely be using key financing arms to direct more venture capital to defence, space and other strategic security needs.

Secondly, we’re seeing much more assertive and strategic approaches to procurement, including indications from some key allies to create strategic reserves of critical minerals, secure supply chains for energy infrastructure and strategic offtake agreements.

Thirdly, we have seen nations explore new ways to use their collective balance sheets. Here’s one example: RBC is one of 10 global banks that is helping to stand up a new entity called the Defense, Security and Resilience Bank, to facilitate capital expenditures across the defense industry–some of which could conceivably be earmarked for energy and mineral development.

This is all part of a new chapter of what some might call state capitalism—or at least the economically activist state. This will be important for the G7+ and others to, at least, monitor, if not coordinate. Especially in terms of how markets across our countries can align and connect to facilitate new capital flows to these growing strategic imperatives.

Governments can also bridge market failures specific to regulatory uncertainties, demand and financing of first-of-a-kind projects. They can procure, finance and invest.

For example, U.S. Defense Procurement Act Title 3 allows for funding of critical minerals. Here in Canada, public entities like the Canada Infrastructure Bank and Canada Growth Fund can be used to help build out the dual use infrastructure of energy, minerals and defence.

The same opportunity exists for business development banks and export finance agencies across the G7+, to help underwrite the risks of new energy ventures as part of a bigger security strategy. It’s these new approaches to finance—ideally through public and private sector cooperation—that can unleash new waves of capital for this new imperative of energy security.

And do it with Silicon Valley speed.

Consider this: In 2022, climate tech private equity and venture capital outraised defense tech at a scale of 7:1. In 2025, the two are essentially even. I think we can all guess how 2026 is shaping up.

For emerging climate tech ventures, tapping into this new paradigm of defence and security capital may be key to the next few years of global innovation. There isn’t time to wait to see how it plays out. Technology is moving fast. Geopolitics are shifting. And a new map of global security is taking shape. Energy and critical minerals will be the ink on that map, and the G7—and the innovators in this room—have the chance to help draw it.

An India-Canada reset is underway, and this time it will require a lot more than handshakes. 

Two years ago, Justin Trudeau sent relations between the two countries reeling. He publicly indicated the Indian government may have been involved in the murder of a Canadian Sikh activist, Hardeep Singh Nijjar, in Vancouver, creating the biggest bilateral crisis in decades. The two governments went on to expel diplomats, froze a range of visa services and suspended trade negotiations. Then came Trump, and a new age of America First that put every other foreign policy second.

This week, the Carney and Modi governments began in earnest a difficult rapprochement that will require some compromise by both. More importantly, it will require them to declare what their mutual interests (rather than shared values) are in an increasingly divided world.

Prime Minister Mark Carney himself opened the door to an interests-based policy when he invited Narendra Modi to the G7 in Alberta, in June. Modi, who was never enamoured with Trudeau, seized the olive branch.

The two governments quickly appointed new high commissioners, and re-engaged on security issues, particularly over the Nijjar case, which they both want to prevent from dominating bilateral relations. 

This week, Foreign Affairs Minister Anita Anand and her Indian counterpart S. Jaishankar met at the United Nations, ahead of a possible visit to India this fall by Anand. And Ottawa quickly moved to action, labelling India’s Bishnoi gang a “terrorist organization,” which will help both countries better police the concerning rise of Indian-based criminal activity in Canada.

All that is good news for those wanting to restore an active partnership, especially for trade and investment. But it won’t be a simple channel change back to a normalized relationship, as the two countries are on different economic, social and geopolitical wavelengths. They’ll have to find some strategic points of interest.

As Canada returns to India, it will need to navigate a more confident and independent power. Canada also needs to recognize that a decade of bilateral opportunities was either lost or fell short. And in that decade, India has changed significantly. 

It has achieved the highest nominal GDP growth among major global economies, while household incomes have nearly doubled, led by rural communities. As the world’s most populous country, India now sees itself as an economic and political power for the mid-century. It’s also quickly becoming one of the world’s most advanced digital nations, with its Aadhaar biometric ID system now covering more than 90% of the population.  

In that decade, Canada added—officially—500,000 people of Indian origin, making South Asia now the largest source of immigration. 

Those two dynamics—rising India and diverse Canada—will require a careful balance.

Carney, so far, has managed to rise above local politics to put Canadian interests at the centre of that balancing act. His government has signalled that a new chapter of India policy will focus first on economic issues, including better guardrails to ensure those interests are protected from diaspora politics.

A more interests-based policy will need to strengthen commercial ties, for both trade and investment. Over the past five years, India has become a strategic option for many Canadians (and others) shifting away from China, even as relations with India chilled and then froze, interest among major investors heated up. Between 2019-2023, Canadian pension funds directed 25% of their investment flows to India, up from 10% over the previous 15 years, as it overtook China to become the second largest destination for Canadian pension funds, behind only the U.S.

Ontario Teachers’ Pension Plan has been at the forefront, investing over the past year in the infrastructure (the National Highways Trust), vehicle finance (Kogta) and AI (Darwinbox). The Brookfield group has been equally active, buying up clean energy assets and telecom sites and, in late September, signing a $1 billion (US) partnership with GIC, a Singapore sovereign wealth fund, to manage more than five million square feet of office space in three major cities, Mumbai, Bengaluru and Hyderabad.

In trade, India has gone from Canada’s 16th largest partner in 2008 to 10th in 2015 to 7th last year.

The same can’t be said about Canada, which ranks only 30th for India. Bilateral trade reached $31 billion in 2024, including services, compared to $117 billion with China. The decline in international students—one of the largest sources of Indian revenue for Canada—will further slow that progress, as Canada’s perceived closed-door policy has tarnished our reputation across a generation of educated Indian youth.  

That’s not the only reason Canada’s quest to restart trade negotiations may require patience. An increasingly confident India—and confident Modi—will not compromise easily, especially over issues like intellectual property rights, which India has long viewed as a form of Western colonialism. 

Those differences aside, the two countries have unique and deep ties, largely through the Indo-Canadian population. Going forward, India will want a more mature relationship, based on interests, especially economic interests. Canada can pursue greater opportunities, too, from heavy oil and LNG to advanced manufacturing and space technologies. 

A renewed relationship will require both countries to recognize what they bring to each other. It can also stress what they can achieve through alliances and multilateral groups. Both Anand and Jaishankar rooted their UN addresses this week in the need for multilateralism in an America First world. India, as a rising second-tier power, and Canada, as a challenged middle power, can both find strength in collective efforts.

Fifty years ago, in 1975, India-Canada relations hit their lowest point after Indira Gandhi’s government tested a nuclear bomb the year before and then declared a State of Emergency. The relationship didn’t recover until Jean Chrétien travelled to India in 1996.

For both countries, too much is at stake for another long winter of discontent. 

The Trump administration’s sweeping AI Action Plan, released last week, moves the global AI race into a new realm. It’s no longer just a race between OpenAI and Google; it’s a geopolitical contest that the world’s greatest tech power is doubling down on, as it seeks to influence (and dominate) the digital decades ahead.

Canada will need to move fast.

Here’s what stands out to me in the Trump policy:

• Jurisdiction. Big data (and AI) is inherently global and local. And now Trump wants to unshackle Big Tech from state-level regulations on AI. Mark Carney may soon face the same challenges with the provinces, as he tries to develop a “one economy” approach to so many things. Both Carney and Trump will face push back if and when the big platforms move into health and education data—seen to be subnational jurisdictions in both countries. But in very different ways, they will need to figure out how to balance individual, local, national and global, in an AI age.

• Ideology. Trump is aiming to “de-woke” AI models. I’m not sure how you do that, especially if you want to avoid some kind of version of thought police patrolling algorithms. I’m not suggesting AI models shouldn’t be accountable to public standards, including free speech. We just don’t know how to temper what we’ve unleashed, other than to prosecute developers under the law, just as we do with other forms of speech. Whatever your view, the Trump policy begins a new chapter in the politicization of tech.

• Investment. A gold rush is underway for data centres and will continue to draw billions of dollars. Trump is laser-focused on keeping and building them in the U.S. Canada can continue to feed that model with our energy, financial capital and data—or build our own competitive strategy. I recently talked with a major investor who is waiting (and waiting) for approval for a mega-billion-dollar Canadian data centre, while he’s moving ahead with similar state-side projects. Data waits for no government.

• Sovereignty. This may be the most challenging one for Canada. The U.S. and Chinese models, and clouds, have become so big and powerful it’s hard to imagine other countries creating anything to rival them. But there’s a chance for Canada. We have global tech leaders, in OpenText, Shopify and Cohere, and some competitive advantages in our own data sets, especially in health care. Is there a moonshot opportunity to build a Canadian rival? And will that require the same sort of techno-nationalist policies we’re seeing emerge in the U.S. and Europe.

As America aims to dominate AI, Canada will need our own human ingenuity to thrive in this new digital order.