The Trade Hub Archives

Noteworthy

By Jordan Brennan, Head of RBC Thought Leadership

Mark Carney is going back to Washington next week. His agenda? Revive “security and economic” ties with the U.S., or at the very least bring some relief to Canada’s beleaguered steel, aluminum and auto sectors.
With security and economic front and centre, other likely topics at the Oval Office could include the Golden Dome missile shield program, something Donald Trump brought up as recently as this week, taking the opportunity to sting Ottawa with another “51st state” jibe. Could Carney push steel and aluminum’s importance as part of the defence collaboration with Washington?
Dominic LeBlanc, the minister responsible for trade with the U.S., sounded upbeat this week about making progress on some of our main pain points with the Trump administration.
The two partners also launched consultations last month on CUSMA ahead of the tripartite trade deal review. But what happens if the days of tariff-free access to the American market are permanently behind us?
It’s not far-fetched to suppose that Canada ends up with a U.K.-style deal, namely an across-the-board ‘market access’ tariff of 10%.
Trump slapped a 25% tariff on the non-U.S. content of automobile exports (the so-called ‘232’ or ‘national security’ tariffs) in March. Given that roughly 50% of the content of a Canadian-assembled vehicle comes from the U.S., Canadian autos have faced an effective tariff rate of about 12.5%. That’s close enough to the 10% market access tariff to warrant comparison.
Both sides are suffering: unemployment in Canada has ticked up since the trade war began, with the auto-producing municipality of Windsor suffering from the highest unemployment rate among Canada’s urban centres. South of the border, the manufacturing sector has shed 40k jobs over the past six months, with additional hits to primary and fabricated metal manufacturing.

The week that was

Canadian softwood lumber producers got hammered with an additional 10% tariff. The new levy will be added to the current 35.16% anti-dumping tariff that the U.S. imposed on lumber imports from Canada this year.
The European Union is expected to announce a 50% tariff on steel imports next week, aligning the bloc with similar U.S. and Canadian measures.
At the request of UK Prime Minister Keir Starmer, U.S. President Donald Trump is said to be considering easing the 10% tariff on imported Scotch whisky.
South Korea’s foreign ministry revealed that Seoul will likely announce a new security agreement with the U.S. before finalizing trade talks.

How to revive economic relations with India

An India-Canada reset is underway, writes John Stackhouse, and this time it will require a lot more than handshakes.

On trade, India has gone from Canada’s 16th largest partner in 2008 to 10th in 2015 to 7th last year.

The same can’t be said about Canada, which ranks only 30th for India. Bilateral trade reached $31 billion in 2024, including services, compared to $117 billion with China. The decline in international students—one of the largest sources of Indian revenue for Canada—will further slow that progress, as Canada’s perceived closed-door policy has tarnished our reputation across a generation of educated Indian youth.

That’s not the only reason Canada’s quest to restart trade negotiations may require patience. An increasingly confident India—and confident Modi—will not compromise easily, especially over issues like intellectual property rights, which India has long viewed as a form of Western colonialism.

Those differences aside, the two countries have unique and deep ties, largely through the Indo-Canadian population. Going forward, India will want a more mature relationship, based on interests, especially economic interests. Canada can pursue greater opportunities, too, from heavy oil and LNG to advanced manufacturing and space technologies.

A renewed relationship will require both countries to recognize what they bring to each other. It can also stress what they can achieve through alliances and multilateral groups.

Read the full column.

An India-Canada reset is underway, and this time it will require a lot more than handshakes.

Two years ago, Justin Trudeau sent relations between the two countries reeling. He publicly indicated the Indian government may have been involved in the murder of a Canadian Sikh activist, Hardeep Singh Nijjar, in Vancouver, creating the biggest bilateral crisis in decades. The two governments went on to expel diplomats, froze a range of visa services and suspended trade negotiations. Then came Trump, and a new age of America First that put every other foreign policy second.

This week, the Carney and Modi governments began in earnest a difficult rapprochement that will require some compromise by both. More importantly, it will require them to declare what their mutual interests (rather than shared values) are in an increasingly divided world.

Prime Minister Mark Carney himself opened the door to an interests-based policy when he invited Narendra Modi to the G7 in Alberta, in June. Modi, who was never enamoured with Trudeau, seized the olive branch.

The two governments quickly appointed new high commissioners, and re-engaged on security issues, particularly over the Nijjar case, which they both want to prevent from dominating bilateral relations.

This week, Foreign Affairs Minister Anita Anand and her Indian counterpart S. Jaishankar met at the United Nations, ahead of a possible visit to India this fall by Anand. And Ottawa quickly moved to action, labelling India’s Bishnoi gang a “terrorist organization,” which will help both countries better police the concerning rise of Indian-based criminal activity in Canada.

All that is good news for those wanting to restore an active partnership, especially for trade and investment. But it won’t be a simple channel change back to a normalized relationship, as the two countries are on different economic, social and geopolitical wavelengths. They’ll have to find some strategic points of interest.

As Canada returns to India, it will need to navigate a more confident and independent power. Canada also needs to recognize that a decade of bilateral opportunities was either lost or fell short. And in that decade, India has changed significantly.

It has achieved the highest nominal GDP growth among major global economies, while household incomes have nearly doubled, led by rural communities. As the world’s most populous country, India now sees itself as an economic and political power for the mid-century. It’s also quickly becoming one of the world’s most advanced digital nations, with its Aadhaar biometric ID system now covering more than 90% of the population.

In that decade, Canada added—officially—500,000 people of Indian origin, making South Asia now the largest source of immigration.

Those two dynamics—rising India and diverse Canada—will require a careful balance.

Carney, so far, has managed to rise above local politics to put Canadian interests at the centre of that balancing act. His government has signalled that a new chapter of India policy will focus first on economic issues, including better guardrails to ensure those interests are protected from diaspora politics.

A more interests-based policy will need to strengthen commercial ties, for both trade and investment. Over the past five years, India has become a strategic option for many Canadians (and others) shifting away from China, even as relations with India chilled and then froze, interest among major investors heated up. Between 2019-2023, Canadian pension funds directed 25% of their investment flows to India, up from 10% over the previous 15 years, as it overtook China to become the second largest destination for Canadian pension funds, behind only the U.S.

Ontario Teachers’ Pension Plan has been at the forefront, investing over the past year in the infrastructure (the National Highways Trust), vehicle finance (Kogta) and AI (Darwinbox). The Brookfield group has been equally active, buying up clean energy assets and telecom sites and, in late September, signing a $1 billion (US) partnership with GIC, a Singapore sovereign wealth fund, to manage more than five million square feet of office space in three major cities, Mumbai, Bengaluru and Hyderabad.

In trade, India has gone from Canada’s 16th largest partner in 2008 to 10th in 2015 to 7th last year.

A renewed relationship will require both countries to recognize what they bring to each other. It can also stress what they can achieve through alliances and multilateral groups. Both Anand and Jaishankar rooted their UN addresses this week in the need for multilateralism in an America First world. India, as a rising second-tier power, and Canada, as a challenged middle power, can both find strength in collective efforts.

Fifty years ago, in 1975, India-Canada relations hit their lowest point after Indira Gandhi’s government tested a nuclear bomb the year before and then declared a State of Emergency. The relationship didn’t recover until Jean Chrétien travelled to India in 1996.

For both countries, too much is at stake for another long winter of discontent.

John Stackhouse is a former editor-in-chief of The Globe and Mail and was its correspondent in New Delhi from 1991 to 1999. He is Senior Vice President, Office of the CEO, at RBC, and a senior fellow at the Munk School of Global Affairs & Public Policy at the University of Toronto.

In this week’s edition: Carney’s U.K. visit, new Trump tariffs, and the potential impact of Canada’s new deal with Indonesia

A critical leadership moment

By Jordan Brennan, Head of RBC Thought Leadership

Prime Minister Mark Carney is back in the headlines today, this time in London with U.K. Prime Minister Keir Starmer. At stake: trade diversification and the kind of economic and security alliances that will define the coming decade. No doubt the security situation in Europe forms part of the backdrop to the conversation, including Russia’s alleged incursions into NATO airspace.
This week’s meeting builds on talks from June. Back then, the development of the UK-Canada Economic and Trade Working Group got rolling, which will make recommendations on barriers to trade and critical minerals, among other topics.
Carney is in a strong spot to lead. With the global order splintering, new partnerships are required to foster security and prosperity. Critical minerals sit at the nexus of both. Secure and stable access to critical minerals is a pre-condition for economic dynamism and geo-political security in the 21^st century. They not only underpin the defence industry—their applications span space exploration, clean technology, the digital economy, health care and much beyond.
Here’s the problem: NATO and allied countries lack a cohesive strategy. This is Carney’s opportunity to shine. The Canadian government could craft a critical minerals strategy in partnership with allied countries that secures supply chains while attending to the dangerous concentration risk posed by China.
As noted in a recent RBC Thought Leadership report, The New Great Game, China is way out in the front, controlling between 60% and 90% of refining capacity for lithium, cobalt, rare earths, and graphite.
Building on Canada’s abundant mineral resources, the strategy would leverage Canada’s strength as the global centre for mining excellence. From copper to cobalt, uranium to nickel, lithium to graphite, Canada possesses the raw materials that nourish frontier industries and the engineering and financing capabilities to drive product to market.
The U.S. is taking bold steps in this space, too. Earlier this week, the White House announced it is seeking a 10% equity stake in Lithium Americas, a Vancouver-based company miner. Backed by a Department of Energy loan, Lithium Americas is developing what may become the largest lithium mine in the Western Hemisphere, built in Nevada.
As it happens, RBC hosted a delegation this week from Washington. Two dozen staff officials from Congress (from both sides of the aisle) and the Canadian Embassy explored the possibility of a critical minerals partnership between Canada and the U.S. Coupled with Washington’s positioning on Lithium Americas, enhanced cooperation on critical minerals might be one avenue to strengthen Canada’s trading relationship with the Americans.

The week that was

Prime Minister Mark Carney will attend the ASEAN summit in October, amid talk of a potential trade deal between Canada and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations bloc at some point next year
Canada should consider making a “business case” to supply liquefied natural gas (LNG) to Germany, its ambassador suggested recently. Germany currently imports about 90% of it’s LNG from the U.S.
If an international pharmaceutical company isn’t building a manufacturing plant in the U.S., its drugs will have a 100% tariff levied on them starting October 1. Foreign-made heavy trucks (25%) and household furniture (30%) will also face new tariffs starting next week.
Trump promised U.S. farmers, who largely voted for him last November but have been hammered by his trade policy, relief by giving them “some of that tariff money.”
The American aerospace giant Boeing may soon land a massive contract with China—potentially a centerpiece of the ongoing U.S.-China trade talks.
Most countries are performing better than expected despite the pressure of tariffs, according to a new report from the OECD.

Tapping Indonesian nickle

By Shaz Merwat, Energy Policy Lead

After four years of negotiations, Canada signed a Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA) with Indonesia last week.

The deal is expected to increase Canadian exports by $447 million–a paltry 0.04% increase over current figures. Still, it provides Canada with a call option on Indonesia’s economic growth. The country is expected to become a Top 5 global economy by mid-century and a vast market for Canadian agriculture, food products, machinery, services and even nuclear technology.

The announcement follows on the heels of the Trump Administration’s reciprocal trade deal with Indonesia, moving quickly to secure valuable critical mineral market access and resources—notably nickel. Indonesia agreed to remove its export restrictions on ore, allowing raw and semi-processed nickel to be shipped to the U.S. for refining and keeping the supply chain out of Chinese-operated Indonesian smelters.

For Canadian miners, the nickel arithmetic is likely negative. According to BNEF, Indonesia’s production of Class 1 Nickel (the higher quality needed for batteries) is expected to reach 1.6 million metric tonnes by 2030, accounting for 52% of the global supply. This puts Indonesian supply in direct competition with Canada (240,000 metric tonnes by 2030) and allows for more tariff-free nickel flows to land in North America–positive for North American security of supply but possibly at the expense of Canada.

The U.S. trade deal with Indonesia is the more impactful and given the lack of domestic mineral resources in the U.S., diversification of resources is key. For Canada, the focus remains leveraging our shared national security interests and economic integration to become a de-risked source of supply; competitive advantages that are more challenging for other trade partners to replicate.

Bottom line

In this week’s edition: The challenges that lie ahead now that CUSMA consultations have kicked off and what a redrawing of the critical minerals map would mean for Canada

The challenges that lie ahead

By John Stackhouse

Mark Carney’s Mexican charm offensive—and successful visit with Claudia Sheinbaum—may soon seem like a happy vacation memory. The two countries return this weekend to harsher realities, especially in their shared as well as separate relationships with the United States. Here’s how it could play out:

The Trump administration has triggered a review of the Canada-U.S.-Mexico trade agreement, by launching public consultations. Canada is expected do the same this weekend, opening the door for 45 days of lobbying, teeth-gnashing and perhaps genuine reflection.
Expect the three amigos (2 amigos + 1 amiga) to then amass small armies of trade and industry experts to begin the more formal dialogue. The Canadian government is already recruiting people to speak with their American and Mexican counterparts, especially in energy, autos, steel, aluminum and lumber. They’re a little worried the Americans won’t show up anywhere near as well prepared and may even push for a quick (and perhaps flawed) deal.
Mexico has taken a different tact, working with U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio on a range of non-trade issues like curtailing drug cartels. They’re hoping that will gain goodwill for the next round of trade talks, which for Mexico are not shaping up well. The U.S. has effectively banned hothouse tomatoes and is clamping down on remittances—all signalling tough times ahead for Mexico.
The biggest issue for Mexico will be “rules of origin,” i.e. how to reverse the massive increase of Chinese investment and trade that turned Mexico into a side door to the U.S. market.
For Canada, early signals suggest Commerce Secretary Howard Lutnick and Trade Representative Jamieson Greer want to protect the foundation of a trilateral trade agreement, with special interest in Canada and enhancing two-way trade. Side agreements or subordinate deals under a North American umbrella could evolve.
For Canada, the biggest existential concern remains autos, and Trump’s apparent desire to move as much Canadian production to U.S. soil. We’ll see if the American industry can persuade him of the economic logic of cross-border production.
Would Canada accept a “market access” tariff of, say, 10% to secure some kind of second life for Canadian factories?
Beyond autos, U.S. concerns continue to focus on dairy and digital. We all know the dairy challenge. On digital, U.S. tech platforms continue to complain about Canada’s treatment of online news. And yet, having compromised on a digital sales tax, the Carney government will be challenged to give again, especially since any concession would likely hurt struggling media and publishers.
For the U.S., the biggest challenge may be more political. Does Trump push for a quick win on CUSMA? And then focus on the bigger challenges of China, India and Brazil? Or does his team work on deep and lasting changes to CUSMA, aiming to present a win ahead of next year’s midterm elections?
Worth noting: Trump’s closest friends continue to suggest he’s open to tearing up CUSMA. Maybe bluster. Maybe leverage. But as the hard work begins, expect some hard challenges to continue to pop up.

The week that was

Speaking at a Halifax Chamber of Commerce event, U.S. Ambassador Pete Hoekstra said he is disappointed by the “anti-American, elbows up” rhetoric from Canadians.
U.S. and Chinese officials gathered in Madrid for their fourth round of talks—to talk about TikTok.
In 2024, China imported US$12.6 billion worth of soybeans from the U.S. Last week: 0. A clear indicator that Beijing isn’t afraid to use agriculture as leverage with Washington.
Trained on 25 years of shopping data, Amazon is releasing a retooled AI agent to assist sellers with inventory decisions to manage the increased volatility caused by the trade war.

Redrawing the critical minerals map

By Shaz Merwat, Energy Policy Lead

A pair of U.S. senators introduced the Restoring American Mineral Security (RAMS) Act, a bipartisan Senate Bill that would establish a Critical Minerals Security Alliance, granting duty-free access among trusted partners and require allies to match U.S. tariffs on Chinese supply.

Here are three implications for Canada:

Alliance membership comes with obligations. Canada would need to mirror U.S. tariff levels on Chinese minerals and strengthen enforcement against Chinese supply/transshipment. Heading into formal CUSMA renegotiations, the U.S. is looking again to allies to close the Chinese back door (note: Mexico increased tariff rates on a number of Chinese goods). Specific to minerals, shutting out Chinese supply is crucial for industry to scale. RAMS makes that firewall a requirement.
Capital will follow the club. Perhaps the most novel element is the U.S. plan to recycle tariff revenues from non-alliance imports into allied projects–20% specifically to support international critical mineral projects in member nations. Still, given our close minerals trade relationship (we are each other’s #1 minerals trade partner), Canada directionally wins from reinvestment in U.S. mineral projects. That could provide ‘cheap’ capital to Canadian miners—historically an obstacle for junior miners.
Preferential access is only useful if we scale. Duty-free treatment would give Canadian producers a cost edge into the U.S. market. But without faster project approvals and similar investments in accompanying transport infrastructure, we lose our advantage. It’s worth noting that there are two minerals projects in the first tranche of Prime Minister Mark Carney’s fast-tracked Major Projects list: McIlvenna Bay (copper and zinc) and the Red Chris mine expansion (copper).

Bottom line

While Canada faces a national shock from its trade relationship with the United States, the provinces are facing differentiated trade shocks that are creating divergences in both growth and growth drivers, according to RBC Economics. Read the full report – Quarterly Canadian outlook: Low but positive growth ahead – RBC

In this week’s edition: Three areas where Canada and Mexico can deepen ties, how one smart idea can help alleviate canola farmers’ China challenge, and why infrastructure, not policy, may be holding us back.

How to reset things with Mexico

By Jordan Brennan, RBC’s Head of Thought Leadership

Six months into President Trump’s trade war, with no deal in sight, Canada has good reason to deepen its partnership with Mexico. (And, based on a couple of recent trips south, the federal and Alberta governments agree).

Despite being Canada’s third largest trading partner, Mexico accounts for less than 4% of Canada’s global merchandise trade, the bulk of which is imports. In 2024, Canada shipped just $9 billion of goods to Mexico while importing $47 billion of Mexican goods.

Make no mistake, no country can displace the U.S. when it comes to trading significance for Canada. But we see three broad areas where Canada and Mexico can deepen ties.

Build Bridges & Infrastructure. Canada’s ‘Maple Eight’ pension funds, with north of $2 trillion in assets, are among the largest in the world and possess expertise in major infrastructure projects like pipelines, rail and port capacity. That’s what Mexico needs: patient capital with financing expertise. Canadian capital is a source of financial influence that could be leveraged to advance geopolitical and trade interests, and enhance commercial ties. Canadian Pacific Kansas City Rail’s investment in the Patrick J. Ottensmeyer International Railway Bridge—a $100M project launched earlier this year that deployed innovative technology to improve continental cargo mobility on the U.S.-Mexico border—is a case in point.
Boost Bilateral Trade. Many of Canada’s export industries—from energy to steel and aluminum, copper, agri-food, softwood lumber, pulp and paper, and plastics—are products the 130-million strong nation imports. Enhanced trade flows, underwritten by the current CUSMA, could help several of our stressed industries find relief.
Unite On CUSMA. While the U.S. will remain the cornerstone of North American trade, both Canada and Mexico must prepare for the joint review of the CUSMA, which is officially scheduled for 2026 but may come sooner. Rather than being played against one another, which Trump has successfully orchestrated until now, diplomatic coordination between Canada and Mexico could affirm treaty mechanisms, ensuring duty-free access for CUSMA-compliant goods. Trade irritants in specific industries (think supply management) and trans-shipment for Chinese goods must be managed. With trade nested in a broader framework that includes border security, defence, infrastructure, and supply chain integrity, all three countries can be made better off by deepening their cooperation, ensuring balanced and mutually beneficial trade across the bloc.

The week in trade

China tariffs on Canadian canola seed exports have prompted calls on the government to limit imports of vegetable oil. Conservative Leader Pierre Poilievre is also demanding the Carney government cancel a $1-billion loan BC Ferries is using to buy Chinese-built vessels.
China also filed a lawsuit over Canada’s import restrictions on steel.
The Ontario government is introducing a $1 billion emergency loan program to qualifying businesses in the steel, aluminum, and auto sectors impacted by U.S. tariffs.
Trade war ripples start to show in U.S. wholesale prices, which were up 3.3%in June YoY, the biggest jump since February.
As it looks to reshore some of its manufacturing–and create 1,000 U.S. jobs–GE Appliances is investing $3-billion in its U.S. factories over the next five years.

Canola in the crossfire

By Yadullah Hussain, Managing Editor, RBC Thought Leadership

Canada’s canola crisis has deepened. Beijing’s 75.8% duty on Canada’s most valuable crop comes after its preliminary investigation found Ottawa provided subsidies and preferential treatment to its farmers.

The levy on canola seeds adds to Beijing’s 100% tariffs already in effect on Canada’s canola oil and meals. Back in April, the Canadian Canola Growers Association (CCGA) told us that farmers were freezing investments over fears that a tariff on canola seeds was the “big shoe to drop.” Chris Davison, President and CEO of the Canola Council of Canada, now believes the Chinese market is “effectively closed” to Canadian canola producers.

That’s another $4.5 billion of commodity trade disrupted and now in search of new, tariff-free markets, joining lumber, aluminum and steel.

Here’s how Canada’s canola crisis is playing out:

Squeezed by two economic giants: Could Beijing be trying to get Ottawa to remove the 100% tariffs on Chinese EVs, and 25% on Chinese steel and aluminum? Beijing will make a final call on canola seed duties in September. But Ottawa is in a bind as it had raised tariffs on imported aluminum and steel to appease Washington’s concern that countries, including China, were Canada as a backdoor to the U.S. market.
Meal plan goes awry: China’s canola meal imports from Canada whittled down to 32,506 tonnes in June—from 141,938 tonnes in June 2024—Statistics Canada data shows.
Oil turmoil: Canada’s canola oil exportsto China amounted to a big fat zero from China in June, industry data shows.
Seed money: Canada’s canola seed shipment to China had fallen to 237,897 tonnes by June 2025, compared to 651,080 tonnes during the same period last year.
Farmers want a cash injection: Farmers should not be asked to borrow their way through a crisis that’s not of their making, the CCGA states. Although that would only exacerbate Beijing’s concerns of Ottawa subsidizing the industry.

Beijing’s concerns of Ottawa subsidizing the industry.

Ease the pain: Boosting domestic demand and processing capacity of biofuels like Sustainable Aviation Fuel (SAF) presents one opportunity to diversify canola demand as a biofuel feedstock. According to Lisa Ashton, our Agriculture Policy Lead: “Canada should consider looking at other countries’ playbooks for expanding domestic biofuel markets and agriculture’s role in its growth.” Brazil, Japan, and Malaysia are all expanding processing capacity for biofuels including SAF and increasing required biodiesel and ethanol blends in convention fuels.

“Our limitation is not policy, but infrastructure”

Jordan Brennan, RBC’s Head of Thought Leadership, recently connected with Trevor Tombe, at the University of Calgary’s School of Public Policy.

Q: What can the federal government do to lessen our dependence on the U.S.?
A: We face significant constraints. Canada’s ability to expand trade with other countries through trade agreements is largely exhausted. India and China, for geopolitical reasons, are unlikely prospects in the near term. Our limitation is not policy, but infrastructure. Geography remains a stubborn fact that requires substantial infrastructure investment. Expanding upon our rail and port infrastructure is a renewed priority federally but will take many years to move the needle.

Q: What do you see as the long-term impact of Trump’s tariff wars globally?
A: The uncertainty from tariff threats alone dampens investment. That itself may lead to a permanent reduction in Canadian productivity if investors perceive a higher level of risk in Canada due to uncertain market access in the U.S. Globally, if there’s one lesson from the 1930s, it’s that protectionist spirals deepen economic pain for all participants. While tariffs might temporarily boost some U.S. industries, the costs to global efficiency and consumer welfare would be substantial.

Q: Are there any new insights that challenge the prevailing wisdom about the broad-based benefits of free trade?
A: The fundamental case for liberalized trade remains strong. But it requires resources, production, and employment to shift across sectors and regions. Some of my work suggests between 1-2% of Canada’s workforce could migrate across provinces in response to eliminating internal trade costs. While these moves are productivity-enhancing for the overall economy in the long run, there are adjustment costs for individuals and some affected businesses impose significant short-term costs on those individuals.

Related: Read Brennan and Tombe’s discussion on interprovincial trade barriers.

Bottom line

Canada imported $43.4 million of distilled spirits from the U.S.—that’s down 62% June YoY. American wine imports were also down 67%.

The week that was

Canada and Mexico agreed to increase collaboration in several key areas: from supply chains and AI to energy security and the digital economy.
Trump follows through on his threat to double tariffs on India to 50% for buying oil from Russia.
U.S. shipments of orange juice to Canada plummeted to a more than 20-year low in June, new data shows.
Japan says the Trump administration promises to fix an “extremely regrettable” tariff rate mistake connected to its deal with the U.S.
In a new survey, nearly 90% say tariffs have negatively impacted U.S. manufacturing and production.
Trump threatens to impose 100% tariffs on foreign semiconductors unless businesses promise to invest in the U.S.
As of midnight on August 8, new U.S. tariff rates came into effect on 90-plus countries.

Who wants to make a deal?

Despite Canada’s growing ambition to widen its pool of trading partners, the latest trade data indicates that diversification is challenging. Exports to countries other than to the U.S. were largely flat in the second quarter–the slight uptick in non-U.S. exports was primarily due to higher gold shipments to the U.K., which more than doubled in value compared to last year because of higher prices.

Three questions…

Nathan Janzen, Assistant Chief Economist with RBC Economics, provides some clarity amid all the chaos around trade.

Q: Can you attach a dollar figure on what U.S. tariffs are costing the Canadian economy?
A: Reduced economic growth on both sides of the border, much of that coming from the uncertainty around future trade policy, has frozen business investment decisions. Canada’s retaliatory tariff measures have been significant in some sectors, including increased tariffs on steel imports from countries other than the U.S., and are raising input costs for Canadian businesses.

But on a relative basis, tariffs have raised costs more in the U.S. than in Canada. Tariff revenues collected by the Canadian federal government, paid by Canadian buyers, rose about $2 billion from a year ago from March through May, which was 1.8% of the value of total goods imported over that period. And a significant portion of those revenues collected will be returned to businesses through a remission process. By comparison, U.S. tariff revenue collected, paid by U.S. buyers, increased $48 billion over that same period, and rose to 10% of the value of imports in June. That is the highest average U.S. tariff rate since the 1940s.

Q: How much has CUSMA shielded Canadian exports?
A: Canada’s pre-existing trade agreement with the United States has backstopped duty free access for the bulk of Canadian exports to the United States. About 90% of Canadian exports have continued to access the United States market duty free March through June and Canada has been left with the lowest average effective tariff rate of any major U.S. trading partner, even with the August 1 increase in the tariff rate to 35% on Canadian exports not compliant with CUSMA.

Maintaining that exemption for duty free trade under CUSMA is critical for Canadian exporters, but is also critical for Canada’s trade partners in the U.S.—Canada was the top export destination for 32 U.S. states last year, and the top import source for 22. The CUSMA agreement does not automatically expire until 2036, but critical negotiations to extend the agreement begin next year.

Q: Canada and Mexico agreed this week to collaborate more closely on trade. What opportunities do you see?
A: More Canadian trade diversification is great—that includes offshore opportunities but also increased trade with Mexico and between Canadian provinces. International trade in services has also been a growing share of both Canadian and global trade, and it is easier to diversify trade in something like professional services where geographic distance is less of a barrier.

But a huge share of trade flows in North America are in the heavily integrated manufacturing sector—and decades of free integration of Canada/U.S./Mexico supply chains means that the sector doesn’t really work without any one participant. U.S. tariffs on products like steel, aluminum, and copper raise input costs and reduce the competitiveness of that integrated North American manufacturing ecosystem relative to offshore production chains in Europe and Asia. It’s not possible to diversify that kind of trade in the short tern without significant, negative economic disruptions on both sides of the border.

Bottom line

US$12 billion

How much the trade war is said to have cost automakers—so far.

No deal. Now what?

By Jordan Brennan, Head of Thought Leadership

The August 1^st deadline came and went without a deal. As a result, the ‘fentanyl tariffs’ on Canadian exports to the U.S. are set to rise from 25% to 35%. This is in addition to sector-specific tariffs (referred to as ‘section 232’ tariffs), which include 50% on steel and aluminum, 50% on some copper products and 25% on the non-American content of finished vehicles.

From one perspective, the absence of a deal can be interpreted negatively. The chill on business investment, which is already chronically weak in Canada, will persist until the tariff war reaches some sort of binding resolution.

On the other hand, the absence of an agreement could be a sign that the Canadian negotiating team is bargaining hard. And with the USMCA backstopping the fentanyl tariffs, the effective tariff rate on Canadian exports will be far less than the 35% base rate.

RBC ran the numbers and found that more than 90% of Canadian merchandise exports to the U.S. are USMCA-compliant and therefore enter duty-free. For all the big, scary numbers, our best estimate is that the effective tariff rate on Canadian exports is about 5% but lower in practice. This reflects the skill and savvy of the Canadian negotiating team, in part, who secured the USMCA backstop, but it also points to the fact that American prosperity, especially in the purple states, is dependent on trade with Canada.

Take the auto industry. President Trump secured the White House, in part, because of support from blue-collar workers in the old rust-belt states who historically supported the Democrats but flipped Republican in 2024. The North American auto industry is built on a north-south axis, with supply chains connecting key producing states like Michigan, Indiana and Ohio with Canadian provinces.

There’s scant evidence that the tariff war, including the 232 tariffs on auto, are bringing auto jobs back to American factories. Recent data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics shows that manufacturing employment in general, and motor vehicle and parts manufacturing in particular, is down since Trump came into office. This inter-dependence puts Canada in a stronger negotiating position than we might be led to believe, given Canada’s dependence on trade with our American neighbours.

We will be watching things unfold in the coming weeks and expect that a deal of some sort will be reached. In the meantime, Trump’s negotiating teams struck a flurry of deals with key trading partners over the past 10 days, including the EU, Japan, and South Korea. Amidst the chaos and uncertainty, a pattern is beginning to emerge.

In exchange for preferential tariff rates, America’s trading partners are pledging large investments and purchases in the American market and are providing enhanced market access for American exporters, with select sectoral exemptions and carveouts. The ‘deals’ struck so far, which appear to be frameworks for negotiations, are distributed across three broad categories:

Close Allies: With the US-UK Economic and Prosperity Deal, the UK secured the most favourable terms to date, with a baseline tariff of 10%. Exemptions and carveouts mean the effective tariff rate could be lower than 10%. The deal focuses on agriculture, auto, aerospace, pharmaceuticals, with steel and aluminum facing higher rates.
The Trading Core: The EU, Japan and South Korea, which are among America’s largest trading partners, have secured a baseline tariff of 15%, which puts them on an even-footing with one another. Again, exemptions and carveouts mean the effective tariff rate could be lower.
Everyone Else: Countries that do not secure preferential rates will be subject to an elevated baseline tariff or ad hoc tariff rate (e.g. 50% tariff on Brazil).

Deal or no deal, Canada faces significant headwinds. A multi-year productivity recession combined with tightened immigration, trade frictions, and elevated macro uncertainty mean there are difficult choices ahead for Canada’s political and business leaders.

The week that was

On top of increasing Canada’s tariff rate right before his August 1 deadline, Trump levelled costly tariffs on a number of countries—including 39% on Switzerland.
Mexico gets a 90-day reprieve following a call between Trump and Mexican President Claudia Sheinbaum.
Transshipments—goods sent to the U.S. through other countries in an attempt to bypass country-of-origin tariffs—will now get hit with a 40% tariff. Experts say China will be hit hardest by the U.S. cracking down on indirect shipments.
U.S. transport stocks suffer biggest dip since April; Dow Jones Transportation Average fell 7%.
Ford, the second biggest U.S. automaker, says the trade deals with the EU, Japan and South Korea puts it at a serious disadvantage since most of its cars are made in America and it relies on importing parts. In Q2 alone, Ford says tariffs cost the company US$800 million.
Fallout from the U.S.-EU trade deal leads to the worst week for the Euro since 2022.

The Trump administration’s sweeping AI Action Plan, released last week, moves the global AI race into a new realm. It’s no longer just a race between OpenAI and Google; it’s a geopolitical contest that the world’s greatest tech power is doubling down on, as it seeks to influence (and dominate) the digital decades ahead.

Canada will need to move fast.

Here’s what stands out to me in the Trump policy:

Jurisdiction. Big data (and AI) is inherently global and local. And now Trump wants to unshackle Big Tech from state-level regulations on AI. Mark Carney may soon face the same challenges with the provinces, as he tries to develop a “one economy” approach to so many things. Both Carney and Trump will face push back if and when the big platforms move into health and education data—seen to be subnational jurisdictions in both countries. But in very different ways, they will need to figure out how to balance individual, local, national and global, in an AI age.
Ideology. Trump is aiming to “de-woke” AI models. I’m not sure how you do that, especially if you want to avoid some kind of version of thought police patrolling algorithms. I’m not suggesting AI models shouldn’t be accountable to public standards, including free speech. We just don’t know how to temper what we’ve unleashed, other than to prosecute developers under the law, just as we do with other forms of speech. Whatever your view, the Trump policy begins a new chapter in the politicization of tech.
Investment. A gold rush is underway for data centres and will continue to draw billions of dollars. Trump is laser-focused on keeping and building them in the U.S. Canada can continue to feed that model with our energy, financial capital and data—or build our own competitive strategy. I recently talked with a major investor who is waiting (and waiting) for approval for a mega-billion-dollar Canadian data centre, while he’s moving ahead with similar state-side projects. Data waits for no government.
Sovereignty. This may be the most challenging one for Canada. The U.S. and Chinese models, and clouds, have become so big and powerful it’s hard to imagine other countries creating anything to rival them. But there’s a chance for Canada. We have global tech leaders, in OpenText, Shopify and Cohere, and some competitive advantages in our own data sets, especially in health care. Is there a moonshot opportunity to build a Canadian rival? And will that require the same sort of techno-nationalist policies we’re seeing emerge in the U.S. and Europe.

As America aims to dominate AI, Canada will need our own human ingenuity to thrive in this new digital order.

In this week’s edition: Signals from the U.S.-Japan deal, the cost of interprovincial trade barriers, and Trump sets his sights on supply management

The week that was

U.S. President Trump, who celebrated a trade deal with Japan earlier in the week, ended the week saying that he wasn’t sure a deal with Canada would be reached–and that the U.S. may unilaterally impose more tariffs on its neighbour.
One‑third of Canadian firms expect tariff‑related cost spikes, down from two‑thirds last quarter, due largely to USMCA exemptions. And half of firms already face higher costs, yet many can’t pass them on, squeezing margins.
In a joint statement, Canada’s premiers call on the Carney government to “improve the overall trade relationship” with China.
Algoma Steel, which sells about 60% of its output to the U.S., is seeking between $400 and $600 million in tariff relief from Ottawa.
U.S. President Trump indicates that 15% is as low as the U.S. is willing to go on tariffs.

When 15% is the new 35%

Tucked away in Japan’s trade deal with the U.S. was a US$550-billion pledge to create a sovereign wealth fund overseen by the U.S. President himself. Could that prove to be the blueprint for Canada and the EU, both of whom are angling to seal trade deals before Aug.1?

Details of the Japan fund are vague with both parties characterizing it very differently: The U.S. sees it as a 90:10 partnership in the U.S. taxpayer’s favour, with Washington dictating Japanese companies where to invest; Tokyo sees it as an investment pledge from Japan Inc. The U.S. is increasingly blurring the lines between creating an ecosystem that facilitates investments to what some are calling state intervention over business investments and activities. The most recent example: A US$400-million direct, China-style investment in rare-earth minerals company MP Materials by the Pentagon—a deal that has been criticized by industry competitors for its overreach.

The U.S. state creep poses a challenge for North American markets that are fair and free, but could start seeing U.S. federal-based entities coming to the fore—a new generation of government-backed entities that Western governments have criticized autocratic states for over the past several decades.

Canada has much to offer to the U.S. as an investor, but in the right circumstances. Canadian stock of U.S. foreign direct investment stands at US$812 billion, second only to Japan’s US$819 billion. In theory, more Canadian investments could be channeled into the U.S., structured to enrich Canadian domestic supply chains as well. The continued integration of Canada and the U.S., in public and corporate sectors, should result in positive spill-over effects for Canada in terms of investments, business activity and trade. There are also may be plenty of room for a slew of joint Canada-U.S. projects—in critical minerals, automotives, nuclear, fossil fuels and electricity, among others.

But if a joint fund of some description is on the table, it can’t be a blank cheque to Washington.
It’s crunch time for Canada, which is also facing 35% tariffs for all non-USMCA compliant goods if a deal is not struck (Both Carney and Trump have downplayed chances of a trade deal by Aug.1.) We may have to contend with 15%, which seems to be the going rate, as Europe appears to be resigning itself to that figure with Washington.

That could prove to be positive for Canada.

Assuming the USMCA preferred treatment remains intact, Canada seems poised to garner a ‘best-in-class’ access to the U.S. market. A possible weighted-average effective tariff rate of 2-3% is attractive both in absolute and comparative terms, assuming a 15% universal tariff rate on only 10%-20% of non-compliant USMCA trade. Essentially that’s similar to most-favoured nation tariff rates (traditionally 2.5%).

3 questions with…

In a week when Prime Minister Carney met with the Premiers, our Head of Thought Leadership Jordan Brennan reached out to Trevor Tombe, at the University of Calgary’s School of Public Policy, to discuss interprovincial trade barriers—and Trump.

Q: How much are interprovincial trade barriers costing Canada?
A: My research with collaborators suggests that Canada’s economy could increase by between 4.4% and 7.9% over the long-term—a gain of between $110 and $200 billion per year—if internal trade barriers are eliminated through mutual recognition policies. In specific sectors like trucking, these barriers add approximately 8.3% to freight rates, inflating business costs and reducing overall productivity. The smaller and generally lower income provinces, especially in Atlantic Canada, stand to gain far more than other provinces.

Q: What do you think the likely economic outcome of Bill C-5 will be?
A: Bill C-5 represents a significant federal effort to address internal trade barriers. However, we should be cautious about immediate GDP impacts. The $200-billion growth figure cited by some represents the upper end of estimates and assumes a massive levelling of trade barriers far beyond anything currently proposed. The real gains will come if provinces reciprocate with their own mutual recognition legislation, but we’re seeing considerable momentum in that regard.

Q: Prime Minister Carney seems to believe that removing internal trade barriers will offset the economic harm associated with Trump’s tariffs. How realistic is this belief?
A: The magnitude of interprovincial trade costs is larger than the costs of U.S. tariff disruptions but would take far longer to manifest. Over time, we could potentially more than compensate, but internal trade liberalization is not a sufficient short-term offset for immediate economic disruption.

Import quotas – a pain point for the U.S.

Canada’s supply management has caught the eye of the Trump administration, again. Critics from south of the border are zeroing in on import quotas specifically for dairy products.

Canada’s supply management system is governed through import quotas, producer set prices, and production quotas for dairy, eggs, and poultry–a policy to guarantee farmers’ domestic market share and fair prices for products relative to farm inputs.
Import quotas are intended to limit imports within Canada’s supply management industries. In recent trade negotiations, however, Canada has made greater concessions. For example, in the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) negotiations, Canada agreed to provide participating countries with an estimated 3.25% of Canada’s domestic dairy market.
As Canada-U.S.-Mexico-Agreement (CUSMA), the Canada-European Union Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) and CPTPP are phased in over the next 10 years, Canadian foreign market access is expected to climb to roughly 10% of Canada’s dairy production.
But as Canadian processors hold most tariff import quotas, foreign importers have argued that they have limited access to Canada’s markets to fulfill their non-tariffed trade volumes negotiated in the agreement.

RBC Thought Leadership’s latest report, Supply Management Explained, explores the benefits and drawbacks of the system and its role in trade wars.

Resourceful ‘Northern America’

Canada and the U.S. ramped up their commodity exports over the past decade, as both countries leverage their resource riches. The latest report from UN Trade and Development (UNCTAD) shows the two countries—comprising ‘Northern America’—raised their combined commodity exports to 13.1% of the global total by 2023, from 10.8% a decade ago. Other regions barely grew or lost market share during the period.

Commodity concentration: Canadian commodity exports—energy, mining and agriculture, as defined by UNCTAD—accounted for 55.8% of its total commodity exports in 2021-23, compared to 53.3% between 2012-14. The U.S. has become even more reliant: the three commodities made up 35.5% of all American commodity exports during the period, up from 29.5%. As both have earmarked energy, ag and mining as export priorities, they could become more dependent on the three commodities—and their price volatility.

Agriculture rising: For Canada, agriculture was able to grow its export market share from 14.7% to 16.7%, with energy, at 17.4%, up only marginally. For the U.S., it was all about the shale evolution and LNG revolution.

Commodity contraction: Globally, commodity exports now account for 32.7% of all international trade in value terms, down from 35.5% a decade earlier.

Strive to diversify. Countries mainly exporting raw materials could miss out on the broader benefits of global trade, driven by diversification, innovation and value-added production. While that UNCTAD warning was directed at developing countries, it should not be lost on Canadian businesses looking to expand mining, energy and agriculture sectors.

Final word

“It’s not our objective to have an agreement at any cost.”

—Prime Minister Mark Carney on negotiations with the U.S.

Contributors: Jordan Brennan, Shaz Merwat, Lisa Ashton, Reid Mckay, Yadullah Hussain, Caprice Biasoni

In this week’s edition: Four potential global trade scenarios, Canada’s agri-food rebound, and why copper is in the crosshairs

Trade war fallout

By Jordan Brennan, Head of Thought Leadership

What if the U.S. is no longer at the centre of the global trading system? That was one of the ideas explored at a Fields Institute-hosted roundtable I attended this week in Toronto.

The U.S. has wielded tremendous soft power through its custody of the global trading system for the better part of 80 years. That came to an end on April 2^nd with President Trump’s ‘Liberation Day’ tariffs, according to one speaker. The speaker went on to claim that the end of American leadership would beget four possible scenarios:

World War Trade. This is a 1930s-style scenario where other countries follow the U.S. in ignoring WTO policies. Unless resolved in the coming weeks, Trump’s tariffs will likely provoke retaliatory tariffs from other countries in a tit-for-tat escalation. In one scenario, the trigger is Chinese retaliation against the anti-China provisions the U.S. is seeking from trading partners (e.g., the U.S.-U.K. deal attempts to lock China out of critical supply chains). This nightmarish scenario, thankfully, is the least likely.
Managed multi-lateral drift. This is the current base case. The world sees more protectionism from the U.S. and more liberalization everywhere else. The U.S. stands alone in violating the WTO rules, but everyone else plays nice.
Fighting trade blocs. Further geo-political fragmentation leads to the creation of adversarial trade blocs. Within the blocs, there is some measure of cooperation and openness. Between the blocs, we see WTO non-compliance. Three main blocs will form: a U.S.-centric bloc with Canada and Mexico, a pan-European bloc, and a China-led bloc. Japan is a wildcard.
Re-globalization without America. This is the most likely scenario. The U.S. will become a more closed economy, trading less with the world. Given that the U.S. only accounts for 15% of global trade, this is not fatal to the international trading system.

It’s not clear what these scenarios would mean for Canada. With more than 75% of our merchandise exports headed to our American neighbours, it is difficult to imagine a future in which the U.S. does not remain Canada’s largest and most important trading partner.

It is possible, strangely, that Canada’s position with the United States is strengthened on a relative basis, given that U.S. tariffs on Canada may end up being considerably lower than those on America’s EU and Asian trading partners. Canada could end up trading more with the United States, not less, despite the tariffs.

It’s also possible, again unexpectedly, that foreign direct investment in Canada is strengthened—think auto—as countries that were happy to pay the ~3% most favoured nation tariff rate now face a 25% tariff wall and will therefore look to pick up spare capacity within North America to work around that wall.

What’s clear is that Canada needs a strong ‘Plan B’ and ‘Plan C’ in the current negotiations with President Trump. Free trade with the U.S. is the preferred outcome, but Canada needs a menu of options if we cannot secure a satisfactory deal.

The week that was

Prime Minister Mark Carney acknowledged that a deal with the U.S. isn’t likely to result in the elimination of all tariffs.
Trump’s tariffs have raked in nearly US$50 billion for the U.S.—so far.
Mexican President Claudia Sheinbaum said she and Carney have spoken about Mexico and Canada increasing collaboration around trade.
A dozen EU nations are considering so-called anti-coercion instrument, that could include new taxes on big U.S. tech firms or investment restrictions, if a deal with the U.S. isn’t struck by Aug. 1.

Protein pop

Canada’s agri-food exports rebounded in May after plunging in April, with meat and seafood exports leading the way. New Statistics Canada merchandise trade data shows meat exports were up 13% in May—largely spurred by pork exports to Japan—while packaged seafood splashed up to 52.9% after a year-long decline.

Why that matters?

Commodities travel the path of least resistance, but adjustments can take time. Thanks to the CPTPP, Japan’s duty on Canadian fresh, chilled or frozen pork of 4.3% is gradually phasing out by April 2027, specifically for products that are “over-gate,” which is Japan’s minimum pricing system for all pork imports. Processed products like sausages that faced tariffs of up to 10% pre-CPTPP, are now fully phased out. Canadian prepared and preserved swine meat, including lunch meat, to the U.S. dropped from $4 million in January to $2.4 million in May, while the same category of exports to Japan rose from $3.2 million in January to $8 million in May.
Canada’s agri-food trade diversification efforts may not be that diversified, yet. The U.S. remains an important partner, especially for highly perishable products like greenhouse tomatoes. Yet, Canada’s agri-food exporters for many categories are on the move and looking to grow in markets where access is already strong, and logistics are in place, including Japan, Mexico, and South Korea. Further unlocks could be markets on the edges with high growth potential for Canada driven by expanded market access. For example, Columbia and Taiwan, both outside of Canada’s top 5 markets for beef and veal export, have grown in export value by 236% and 57%, respectively, between May 2024 and 2025.

Bottom line: With a tariff-free North America looking more unlikely, Canada continues to diversify its agri-food trading partners and appears to be focused on growing in existing tariff-free or low-tariff markets.

The big number

84

Percentage of Canadians who don’t expect the Trump administration to negotiate in good faith.

Copper in the crosshairs

Copper is now a target of the Trump Administration’s AI-centered energy and resource security agenda, where the commodity’s utility as an electrical conductor makes it a priority for the transformers, transmission lines, and battery technologies that will underpin the buildout of AI infrastructure. By the end of the month copper imports into the U.S. could face 50% tariffs, the latest metal to become front and centre in a realignment of resource supply chains.

The U.S. imported 42% of its refined copper on average in the past four years. But with 5% of global reserves, there is scope to expand domestic production.
Canada occupies a relatively small share of global copper refining, responsible for 1.2% of refinery production in 2024, and approximately 0.8% of reserves.
Canada is a major supplier of copper to the U.S. in the form of ore and concentrate, refined copper, copper scrap, and copper matte and precipitate, and exports to Asia and Europe. Canadian exports to the U.S. were worth $4.8 billion in 2023.
The effect of the copper tariffs will be felt less in some provinces. B.C., for instance, hosts Canada’s largest copper mines but doesn’t export significantly to the U.S. But others could be more susceptible. Quebec hosts a copper smelter and a refinery and accounted for 80% of copper exports to the U.S. in 2024, according to data from Innovation, Science, and Economic Development Canada.
Canadian mines produced 508,000 tonnes of copper in 2023, and the country counted 14 copper deposits among its top 100 mineral exploration projects in 2024. Expanding Canada’s reserve base and bringing more Canadian copper to market, whether at home or abroad, will be important for achieving our energy and AI ambitions.

Eye on Africa

Africa has long been a battleground for the China and the U.S. as they vie for economic and trade influence in the continent. The competition has only intensified as the two countries seek access to minerals, from gold to graphite. The U.S. is trying to break Chinese sway in the continent by brokering a peace between Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). Washington also recently wrapped up a U.S.-Africa Business Summit with US$2.5-billion investment commitment, that included US$1.5 billion towards a 1,150-kilometre transmission line from Angola to deliver 1.2 gigawatt electricity to power DRC mining sites. In return, the U.S. gets access to DRC’s natural resources that include two-thirds of global cobalt that power EV batteries. It’s also the largest supplier of tantalum–a critical metal used in capacitors–and the world’s second largest supplier of copper.

Africa could prove to be a new, thriving trading destination as Ottawa casts its export net wider. There are opportunities abound:

Canada-Africa trade has tripled over the past 25 years, but still accounts for a mere 1% of Canada’s total trade volume.
Canada could sell cleantech to a continent that remains heavily dependent on coal, especially in growing economies like South Africa. May be LNG, too.
Canada can also export mining equipment and clean extraction methods in resource-rich African nations.
Health-tech and pharma services could also boost digital health services, especially in the continent’s underserved regions. Edu-tech exports to a continent with the world’s youngest population could prove to be another winner.
Africa’s critical minerals supplies offer diverse range of inputs to EV battery supply chains, offering analternative to Chinese-controlled resources.

Final word

“We’ve been clear from the get-go that supply management is off the table.”

—François-Philippe Champagne, Canada’s Finance Minister, on the protections in place on dairy and agriculture not being part of the U.S/Canada negotiations.

Trade Zone: What if we don’t get the deal we want?

Platform: The Trade Hub