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RBC Thought Leadership Shiplu Talukder

U.S. President Donald Trump finally dropped the hammer on the auto sector with tariffs on automobile and parts imports, upending the global auto industry and threatening economic damage on major suppliers to the U.S. market. The headline 25% U.S. levy has dominated the news but, as we discuss, the true cost of tariffs will be in the details. With countries from Canada to Germany to Japan roiled by the announcements, the industry is grappling with the following questions:

1. How will the tariffs be applied?

  • The proclamation is light on detail on targeted automobiles and automobile parts. Engines and engine parts, transmission and powertrain parts, and electronic components were singled out in a 2019 investigation into the impacts of automotive imports on U.S. national security.

  • But industry remains uncertain about the extent of tariff applicability this time around. The proclamation also allows the U.S. Secretary of Commerce and domestic producers of automobiles or auto parts to request parts not already included to be tariffed in the future.

  • The U.S. imported US$83 billion in auto parts and accessories (not including engines) in 2024, with Mexico and Canada supplying 41% ($35 billion) and 13% (US$11 billion), respectively.

2. How will tariffs be implemented and compliance determined?

  • The true cost of tariffs will depend on the amount of U.S.-origin content in imported vehicles, but specifics remains unclear.

  • According to the president’s order, the 25% tariff will apply to the value of non-U.S. content in imported vehicles. However, discussions between the U.S. and Canada suggest CUSMA-compliant automobile imports with at least 50% U.S. content may be exempt. Those with less than 50% U.S. content may receive 12.5% tariffs.

  • Automotive parts will see tariffs of 25% applied to the value of non-U.S. content, according to a process being determined by U.S. Customs and Border Protection and the U.S. Secretary of Commerce. They are expected to come into force by May 3.

3. How will supply chains be affected?

  • The co-development of U.S., Canadian, and Mexican automotive industries have enabled efficiencies of production and market growth across the continent, from the Automotive Products Trade Agreement in 1965 (also known as the Canada-U.S. Auto Pact) through the integration of Mexico via NAFTA in 1994, and more recent renegotiations of Regional Content Values (RCV) under CUSMA.

  • Over the past three decades, Mexico has steadily gained on the U.S. in production share of passenger vehicles in North America, rising from 10% pre-NAFTA in 1991, to 30% of passenger car manufacturing within the continent by 2023. Over the same period, the U.S.’s share of passenger car manufacturing dropped from 75% to 58%. Mexico surpassed Canada’s production share within the continent in 2008.

  • Though Canada’s share of passenger vehicle manufacturing grew from 15% in 1991 to peak at about 22% by 2005, it had dropped to 12% by 2023.

  • A similar trend has emerged in motor vehicle parts. From supplying 9% of U.S. imports in 1990, Mexico has grown to 41% of automotive parts imports in 2024, while Canada’s contribution has reduced to 13% in 2024 from a 1990 peak of 36%.

  • Data on the geographic origins of components across 315 car models available to the U.S. public between 2021-2025, show that, combined, U.S. and Canadian auto parts make up as much as 77% of the total value of certain models, with Mexican origin parts reaching as much as 80% in others.

  • Such high levels of integration means tariff-driven disruptions to automotive supply chains have a high likelihood of rippling through the industry, raising costs and putting pressure on manufacturers, distributors, and consumers across all geographies.

4. What’s the way forward?

  • The precise nature of tariff applicability, compliance, and enforcement remains largely uncertain, leaving manufacturers with few clear options on the way forward.

  • What’s certain is that impacts will be felt on both sides of the border, with 35 U.S. districts across 26 states importing auto parts from Canada in 2024, and southern Ontario’s automotive sector among the hardest hit.

  • The severity of reciprocal tariffs would dictate the added burdens on auto and parts manufacturers. Canada’s response to the U.S. auto tariffs would also determine the future of RCV-based tariff exemption thresholds.

Vivan Sorab is Senior Manager, Clean Technology, RBC Climate Action Institute

This article is intended as general information only and is not to be relied upon as constituting legal, financial or other professional advice. A professional advisor should be consulted regarding your specific situation. Information presented is believed to be factual and up-to-date but we do not guarantee its accuracy and it should not be regarded as a complete analysis of the subjects discussed. All expressions of opinion reflect the judgment of the authors as of the date of publication and are subject to change. No endorsement of any third parties or their advice, opinions, information, products or services is expressly given or implied by Royal Bank of Canada or any of its affiliates.

It has been 70 days since U.S. President Donald Trump directed eight federal agencies to commence the review, design and implementation of his America First Trade Policy (link). In total, over 20 investigations have progressed concurrently, to be delivered to the President on April 1.

While the final “reciprocal” tariffs are most likely a catch-all trade response to these investigations, their recommendations will shape the course of the Administration’s trade path over the next four years. In essence, we are entering a new phase – one (hopefully) out of a sprint and into a more measured pace, across six key trade themes that extend beyond the use simple tariffs as identified in the graphic below.

To get a sense of what to expect over the next few months from a hawkish Washington, read John Stackhouse’s interview with Steve Verheul, Canada’s Chief Trade Negotiator in the renegotiation of NAFTA (now CUSMA), on how he sees the trade war playing out. For more, see here.

Trump’s America First Trade Policy

Trade Investigations Due April 1

Source: whitehouse.gov

This article is intended as general information only and is not to be relied upon as constituting legal, financial or other professional advice. A professional advisor should be consulted regarding your specific situation. Information presented is believed to be factual and up-to-date but we do not guarantee its accuracy and it should not be regarded as a complete analysis of the subjects discussed. All expressions of opinion reflect the judgment of the authors as of the date of publication and are subject to change. No endorsement of any third parties or their advice, opinions, information, products or services is expressly given or implied by Royal Bank of Canada or any of its affiliates.

China retaliated with tariffs of its own on various Canadian agricultural exports in response to Ottawa’s tariffs last fall on Chinese electric vehicles and metals.

The new tariffs mark an escalation in trade tensions between Canada and China, with the risk tilted to the upside. It comes as the agriculture sector is already experiencing challenges posed by the trade uncertainty with the United States.

Another hit to Canadian exporters

China imposed 100% tariff on Canadian exports of canola oil, canola oil-cake, and pea imports, and 25% duties on pork and aquatic products, which is expected to hit some industries and provinces hard.

The tariffs are expected to affect approximately $2.9 billion of domestic exports (in 2024), with seafood products making up the largest share at nearly $1.2 billion, followed by canola oil and cake at $938 million, and pork products ($467 million). China is also Canada’s second-largest export market for listed pea products ($306 million).

While the tariffs are expected to target only a small share of total Canadian domestic merchandise exports—roughly 0.4% in 2024—they are likely to pose challenges for some Canadian agricultural exporters.

Although China remains an important Canadian market for these products, its share of total exports has declined in recent years. In 2019, China accounted for roughly $3.8 billion (25%) of the export value of these goods, which has since declined to $2.9 billion, or 14%, in 2024. Over the same period, Canadian exporters have shifted to the U.S., with exports for these goods rising from $7.2 billion (47%) in 2019 to $12.3 billion (60%) in 2024. But that pivot to the U.S. could prove to be costly if Washington rolls out tariffs on Canadian exports as part of its April 2 trade “liberation day,” or later this year.

Atlantic provinces in the eye of the storm

Among provinces, Nova Scotia is most exposed to these tariffs. The affected goods account for approximately 9.2% of the province’s total domestic exports. Notably, China is Nova Scotia’s second-largest export market for lobsters, which amounted to nearly $452 million in export value in 2024.

Newfoundland & Labrador shrimp exporters ($105 million) and Saskatchewan’s exporters of canola oil and cake ($515 million) are among the most exposed within their respective provinces. The listed tariffed goods account for approximately 1.7% and 1.5% of their total domestic exports, respectively.

China whips out an old playbook

China’s newly imposed duties on Canadian agricultural exports are not unprecedented. In 2019, China’s import restrictions on some Canadian canola exporters, led to a sharp decline in imports of Canadian canola seeds to the world’s second largest economy.

The restrictions are estimated to have contributed to significant losses for Canadian exporters, on reduced export volumes and the prices received for their products. The Canola Council of Canada estimated that between March 2019 and August 2020, China’s actions cost the domestic industry between $1.54 billion and $2.35 billion in lost sales and lower prices.

If the tariffs persist for some time, canola farmers fear job losses, declines in production volumes, and capital cuts beyond the projects that are already under way, according to an industry executive.

While the new tariffs could trigger losses for the targeted industries, the more significant risk stems from the potential escalation of the trade conflict. The latest measures, introduced on March 20th, followed China’s anti-discrimination investigation into Canada’s tariffs on Chinese EVs and metals. Meanwhile, China’s ongoing anti-dumping investigation into Canadian canola (including seeds) and chemical products raises the possibility of additional trade barriers. Given that China remains Canada’s largest export market for canola seeds – valued at approximately $4 billion in 2024 – any further restrictions could have significant economic repercussions on the industry.

Salim Zanzana is an economist with RBC Economics.

This article is intended as general information only and is not to be relied upon as constituting legal, financial or other professional advice. A professional advisor should be consulted regarding your specific situation. Information presented is believed to be factual and up-to-date but we do not guarantee its accuracy and it should not be regarded as a complete analysis of the subjects discussed. All expressions of opinion reflect the judgment of the authors as of the date of publication and are subject to change. No endorsement of any third parties or their advice, opinions, information, products or services is expressly given or implied by Royal Bank of Canada or any of its affiliates.