Expert Commentary

I was in Houston this week for CERAWeek, the so-called Super Bowl of Energy, for a series of intense, and informative, discussions about the current global energy crisis. Last year, the forum was all ears as the new Trump administration laid out its plans for “energy dominance.” This year, the forum was all about the dominant energy crisis unleashed by the Iran war.

1. Watch for the aftershocks

The prevailing view was the conflict — and dangers in the Persian Gulf — will continue for some time, and energy markets will struggle to find a new normal. Former Defence Secretary James Mattis, who has fought three wars in and around the Gulf, said the U.S. cannot declare unilateral victory. Even though Iran’s navy is destroyed, it can deploy anti-ship cruise missiles from its 1,000-kilometre coastline. That means a longer conflict than was first anticipated, and more economic reverberations as supply chains stay gummed up. Traffic through the Strait of Hormuz is down 70%, with 850+ tankers stuck in the crosshairs. It will take weeks just to move that traffic — one reason the IEA called this the “greatest global energy and food security challenge in history.”

2. Oil gets the attention; gas causes the pain

The LNG market disruption is not a temporary shock. QatarEnergy’s CEO confirmed that about 17% of Qatar’s LNG export capacity will be offline for years, with billions of dollars in repairs required. LNG margins are already 200% higher on average for 2026 through 2028. New supply from Australia, Canada, and the U.S. will now just replace the losses, rather than add to supply growth. That means a return to pre-war LNG supply levels is unlikely before late 2027 at the earliest. Analysts at S&P Global Energy expect losses of up to 35 million tonnes of LNG in 2026 — enough to cover half of Japan’s annual imports.

3. Next, food

The World Food Programme warned as many as 45 million more people could fall into acute food insecurity if the conflict doesn’t end soon — a crisis that rivals Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. One big reason: 30% of global urea trade comes out of Iran and Hormuz-constrained countries, and fertilizer exports from the Persian Gulf have dropped precipitously, driving up prices globally and threatening spring planting seasons. Bunker and cargo costs are up 4x in Europe, adding to the transport nightmare. Agriculture input prices have nearly doubled in Egypt. Fertilizer plants in India, Bangladesh, and Pakistan have had to stop production entirely as natural gas and oil prices spiked — and unlike in 2022, there are few alternatives. India cut output from three of its urea plants. Bangladesh shut four out of its five fertilizer factories.

4.  Alarms across Asia

The Strait is the only sea route for 93% of Japan’s oil imports, prompting Tokyo to begin releasing 80 million barrels of oil from its strategic reserves. Japan’s LNG buffer is considerably thinner — Japanese companies hold only about three weeks of LNG inventory, equivalent to the total volume of their Hormuz-dependent LNG imports. Taiwan and South Korea are as severely threatened. In South Asia, fuel rationing is well underway. Pakistan and Bangladesh rely on Qatar for roughly half of their LNG imports. Asian LNG spot prices have surged 143% since February 28.

5. Emerging market risks

Rising debt costs and higher import prices have always been a curse for developing countries, especially those that leveraged foreign credit and energy to stimulate growth. In several African economies, energy and transport account for 15-25% of inflation. The Asian Development Bank has identified the Philippines, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka as the most vulnerable in that region. Ripples will be felt in low-cost manufacturing belts, too, as input costs — petroleum-based plastics, for instance — rise. All that will put pressure on indebted countries to borrow more to subsidize consumers and industry, just as interest costs are rising again. In Uzbekistan, Egypt and Mongolia, fuel subsidies account for 28.3%, 28.0% and 11.9% of government spending, respectively. Those dependent on tourism, such as Kenya and Sri Lanka, may be further challenged.

6. A new moment for data centres

It’s widely viewed that power demand from AI-driven data centres will continue to surge, and there won’t be enough gas to run them. Big Tech companies like Google and Microsoft are developing plans to use nuclear, even reviving mothballed plants in the U.S. But that will take years. Data centres now account for 4% of U.S. electricity, and projections are it’s heading to 12%. It’s not just a U.S. and Chinese phenomenon. Asian countries like the Philippines have ambitious data centre strategies, predicated on more imported gas to run them, but will now need that gas — at a much higher cost — to keep factories and the AC running. The supply-demand imbalance doesn’t compute.

7. A new moment for #EVs

The energy shock has put a new light on China’s ambitions to sell EVs to the world, especially the developing world — if those energy-dependent countries can find new ways to electrify their fleets. Currently about 60% of the world’s pure EVs are sold in China. Will the energy shock shift growth? That will take time, especially for countries facing a host of other challenges to build out electric infrastructure. Expect most countries to have both gas- and electric-powered cars for a long time — even the U.S. Fordmotor Co used the Houston forum to promote its strategy for a new electric pick-up truck, being developed at a skunk works plant in California. The truck’s appeal is its simplicity more than its energy needs. The new vehicles use a fraction of the components (it’s all battery) and a fraction of the internal wiring, making it far easier and cheaper to make. U.S. automakers are also learning from China on how to build vehicles as tech platforms. The biggest question in Ford CEO Jim Farley’s mind: How will Americans react? As Ford knows, cars are culture.

8. New frontiers for drilling

It’s early days — and lots of contingencies are emerging — but as much as 10 million barrels a day of production may be lost this year due to the conflict. That’s roughly 10% of global needs. There are plenty of oil fields that can replace that — just not quickly or efficiently.  Take Venezuela. Its recent increase of 250,000 barrels per day over 2026 represents less than 0.3% of global consumption. Neighbouring Guyana offers more hope, as does Brazil, Nigeria and even Libya. But all those together don’t get anywhere near the missing barrels. There was chatter  at CERAWeek about a return to Alaska drilling, North Sea exploration and even Norway’s Far North. Canadian production is expected to increase, too, including offshore opportunities in Newfoundland and Labrador. But most eyes are on Russia. It may have 80 million barrels of oil currently on the open seas, and a multiple of that ready to go.

9. Canada’s pitch

Energy Minister Timothy Hodgson didn’t mince words. Canada will produce and export a lot more oil and gas, He even put numbers on it: 2.5 million more barrels a day of oil (a 50% increase) and 100 billion cubic feet of gas (double projections) by 2035. He told various audiences that Indigenous support has rarely been stronger for resource development, in part because most big resource projects now have indigenous ownership. Premier Danielle Smith told one audience an agreement between Ottawa and Alberta on carbon pricing is coming and will be critical to long-term contracts. It can also underpin plans for a massive investment in carbon capture and storage, something the Carney government remains insistent on. Behind closed doors, sovereign wealth funds, multinationals and state corporations lined up to advance negotiations for long-term contracts and equity stakes. A universal question among them: Can #Canada execute this time at speed and scale?